Daily Report

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FBIS-LAT-89-133 *13 July 1989*

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Cuba

Former FAR, MININT Officers Executed 13 July

FL1307131889 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1302 GMT 13 Jul 89

[Report: "Special Military Tribunal Sentence Applied"]

[Text] At dawn this morning, 13 July, the sentenced handed down by the special military tribunal in Case No 1 of 1989 was applied against the sanctioned individuals Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, Jorge Martinez Valdes, Antonio de la Guardia Font, and Amado Padron Trujillo. The sentence handed down by the special military tribunal, which tried those involved on charges of drug trafficking and other crimes, was ratified by the plenum of the Council of State.

During the past few days, our people have demonstrated through messages and telegrams their support for the decision made by the special military tribunal that tried the 14 individuals implicated in drug trafficking and other crimes that constitute a crime against the fatherland. The national organs of dissemination reported extensively on the legal process and our people learned of the magnitude of the acts for which these former officials of the FAR [Revolutionary Armed Forces] and MININT [Interior Ministry] were tried and sanctioned.

Castro Addresses State Council on Drug Trial

PA1207050389 Havana Domestic Radio and Television Services in Spanish 0030 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Speech by President Fidel Castro Ruz, at the Council of State meeting in Havana on 9 July—recorded]

[Text] Comrades of the State Council:

We are witnessing a unique situation and for this reason the State Council has found it necessary to adopt a very important decision.

Realizing that this had to be done, I reached the conclusion over the course of the process—and most particularly in its final stage—that it was necessary that all State Council members be present during this historic decision. For this reason, we made special efforts to enable Comrade Almeida [Juan Almeida Bosque] and Comrade Robaina [Roberto Robaina Gonzalez], who were in Pyongyang, to urgently travel back to Cuba and be ready to participate in the meeting of the State Council.

Comrade Fernandez [Education Minister Jose Ramon Fernandez] had been designated to attend the inauguration of the Argentine president and we decided to make a change and replace him with another comrade so that he could attend this meeting. Therefore, all the members of the State Council are present.

I will need to speak somewhat at length to refer to certain background data; to sort of recount what has happened; to give my points of view on the way you have expressed yours; and also to perhaps contribute some elements that may be helpful in adopting a final decision with regard to this case.

I feel that this case has been characterized by its exceptional honesty. I do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that there has never been a judicial process that involved such large participation, so much information, so much clarity, and so much equitability. I think that never before have so many people been able to express their views in a process like this. Possibly, there has never been so honest a process. I think it is advisable to make a few remarks about this.

This has been an extremely brief trial, but the measures that were adopted for this trial to be carried out with full objectivity and full justice have also been exceptional. I must say that even though the court was a special military court—and military activities are characterized by discipline—there was at all times absolute respect for the criterion of the court and of the members of the court.

I was in close contact with the prosecutor. I was also in contact with the tribunal members throughout the process, but had no influence whatsoever on the decision they eventually made. Once the hearing had concluded I asked the tribunal members about their views—first, out of respect for those dignified, serious, and responsible comrades; and second, because we believed that it was most important to hear what they thought about everything they had ascertained and learned throughout the trial.

They came to a decision with absolute freedom. Logically, we could exert our influence on the prosecutor and his views because he is part of the state, and he has to make sure that the law is enforced because that is his mission. However, the tribunal's mission was to judge and decide, and the tribunal members took into consideration the prosecutor's request, but they freely decided what sentence should be issued based on the gravity of the case.

They decided to reduce the number of death sentences. They even decided to increase the sentence, from 25 years to 30 years, for one of the defendants, Miguel Ruiz [Poo]. They decided to reduce the sentence of one of the convicted persons—from the 15 years that the prosecutor requested to 10 years. This viewpoint prevailed throughout the process.

We never tried to exert any influence on the investigators or their viewpoints; and we did not try to exert any influence on the witnesses or the defendants. Therefore, this trial has been characterized by truly exceptional cleanliness. Also, and you know about this, during the exchange of views we had at the Politburo, Central

Committee, Executive Committee, and Council of Ministers I said that the ultimate decision would be made by the State Council—regardless of what the Politburo and Central Committee members thought.

The State Council had to exert its constitutional rights and make the ultimate decision if the final decision came under its jurisdiction, meaning, if a death sentence might be issued or when a death sentence had been issued against several of the accused. Thus, it was clearly stated that the ultimate decision of what should be done would not depend on the Politburo, or the Central Committee, or the Council of Ministers; and that the State Council would be absolutely free to carry out its duties.

You are the best witnesses to the fact that no one talked with any of the State Council members; that I have not talked with any of them about their views; that Comrade Raul nor any other vice president of the State Council have even talked about the decision that must be made in today's meeting in a truly free way. Not all the State Council members are members of the Politburo, but those who are, knew that they were completely free to decide. Not all are members of the central committee; we have here several comrades who are members of the state council, but not members of the central committee. Not one of them was asked about his opinion; not one was asked to state his views in advance, so we have respected—to the smallest detail—the principles of equity and justice; and you have stated your views accordingly.

It was also our idea that if all has been divulged—at the honor tribunal and the trial sessions—then we also had to divulge what each one of us said here. Thus, the people would hear what each of us said and how the state council meeting was carried out. I believe that this will give the people the opportunity to learn about all the views, arguments, and criteria—although there is another issue that we have reasserted throughout this process. We said that the decision we adopted would not be determined by public opinion or polls of people's opinion.

It could happen that most of the population had an opinion and we might have to adopt another opinion. Comrade Carlos Rafael [Rodriguez] talked about that this evening, when referring to a leader's responsibility. A leader cannot think only about today or the near future; he must think in the long term, meaning what is most convenient for our homeland, our people, or the revolution—not today or tomorrow, but 10, 50, even 100 years from now. If it were a matter of basing our decisions on simple polls, then no meeting or state council decision would be necessary.

We know about other opinions and we know that the people think, but it is my duty to say that this does not represent a determining factor in circumstances like this. It is best for us to coincide with what the people think, but it does not necessarily mean that we have to do what the people want or what the people think. Our duty is to judge these events with a lot of serenity, calm, reflection, and cold blood.

I think I am pretty well informed on the events that occurred. As Raul explained, I spent over 150 hours at the MINFAR [Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces] alone since the main people responsible for these events were arrested. I have much information about what was discussed at the honor tribunal and the oral hearing; about everything that was publicized, and the publicity was very extensive. Only a few things were not publicized because they were too unpleasant. These are things that have to do with moral matters that could affect innocent people and turn out to be too scandalous. We decided that those things would not be publicized.

Errors were made, particularly in Ochoa's case. There were violations of certain revolutionary principles, and there were errors on an international level that could have done our country a great deal of damage; these errors involved very sensitive issues that were analyzed at the court of honor and the oral proceedings, but were not published because they could have created further problems and difficulties, even though they would have had no impact on the decisions that had to be made.

There are certain quite important issues that must be raised, issues that concern the revolution's history and struggles, its internationalist spirit and missions, which were not mentioned because the comrades wanted to be brief. Brevity was necessary because there was not much time available.

One of these issues is what the Cuban people may think of our sending thousands, tens of thousands of our soldiers on internationalist missions under the leadership of an irresponsible, uncontrollable chief, under the leadership of a chief capable of any adventure? I believe it is very important to explain this point, because a mistake in that direction could make the Cuban people lose confidence in the party directorate, and in the FAR [Revolutionary Armed Forces] directorate. This is not, nor can it be the case [with our chiefs]. All the military unit chiefs and the mission chief are necessary elements, but it must be clear that, in fulfillment of these internationalist tasks, it is impossible, it is inconceivable to delegate to any military chief—regardless of how brilliant and capable he may be—the power to make important strategic or tactical decisions in fulfillment of those missions. Not even if he were a Clausewitz [Prussian general], the famous theoretician in military strategy, or a Bonaparte, the famous warrior who is said to have been very capable in his time and his era, our party and our revolution would not delegate such power to its mission chief. On each of these important internationalist missions, in which the lives of thousands of men are at stake, these powers are and have been exercised, I repeat, they are and have been exercised by the party's directorate and the FAR High Command. The lives of our people's

sons, our fighters, are so important that they cannot be placed in any hands but those of members of the party directorate and the FAR High Command.

The world has witnessed brilliant generals, who have won wars at the cost of many lives, of the sacrifices of many men. One characteristic of our revolution, since the days of Sierra Maestra, is its achievement of many great victories, not the way those famous generals achieved victories, but by making a minimum of sacrifices and experiencing a minimum of losses. A general might say: I am going to win that battle at the cost of many thousands of lives. This has never been the revolution's philosophy or doctrine. The revolution did not take shape based on a military academy or reading history books or books on strategy and tactics. Our revolution took shape alongside our men, during the days when we were just a handful. We had this kind of experience for many years.

This is why I say that all the missions—those in Angola, Ethiopia, everywhere—have been the responsibility of the party leadership and the FAR High Command. If anything went wrong, we would have been responsible for that—absolutely responsible. We were not going to blame any military commander or leader for that. It could not be any other way. There is a tendency throughout the world to credit individuals for achievements. Often I am credited with all the revolution's achievements and people speak about Castro's achievements and Castro's decisions when referring to the achievements of the people and of the leadership as a whole. I prefer being made responsible for setbacks rather than for achievements. During wartime there is also a tendency to see the merits of the commander and to forget the merits of the soldiers, the sergeants, the lieutenants, the captains, and others.

The last phase of the Angolan War was truly heroic, extraordinarily heroic. We know very well each person's merits during those heroic deeds. We have not forgotten for one second what our pilots did. They carried out thousands of missions and played a decisive role in Cuito Cuanavale. We have not forgotten our sappers, who laid thousands of mines and dismantled enemy mines. We have not forgotten our infantry men, our tank personnel, our artillery men, the antiaircraft defense units, the explorers, and the engineers, who also performed heroic deeds. We are special witnesses of their efforts and merits because, at that time like today, we have spent a lot of time with the staff and have worked long hours for nearly 1 year during which time the last phase of the Angolan War ended in victory.

This is why it is impossible not to consider this aspect when discussing a case like this. What were the circumstances under which those events took place? Amid a war, amid a war on which our country gambled—we might say—everything. It sent its best weapons and 50,000 men to that war. If you want to have an idea of what 50,000 men represent, let us multiply this figure by 24. That gives us 1,200,000. It would be like the United States sending 1,200,000 men to a theater of operations, or like the Soviet Union sending 1,400,000 men.

The USSR is 28 times larger than Cuba, and this small country—which had a military mission in Ethiopia and another military mission in the Congo, with a relatively large number of men—was able to send 50,000 men to a territory that is more distant from us than Moscow—and one must not be guided by the map but by the flight time between Cuba and Angola. Consider the distance. Our revolution, with its internationalist spirit, its combat morale, its capacity for mobilization, was able—I repeat—to make a great effort. We sent this last reinforcement exclusively with our own means, such as when the internationalist mission began in Angola. Our ships were the ones to carry the men and equipment. On this occasion, we alone sent reinforcements with our ships and our aircraft. We sent the required number of men and the means to solve the problem in that country.

It was precisely when this great deed was being accomplished—the biggest internationalist feat Cuba has carried out—that these shameful and hateful actions took place. I asked the comrades on the General Staff to put together a file of the messages we sent to Angola during that period—the critical period. Of course, they put together over 100 messages which I had addressed to Ochoa. I decided to go over all that material in order to become familiar with what was happening there at every instant and to compare it with everything that they were doing here, everything they were doing here in connection with this problem.

Ochoa was named chief of the mission in Angola during early November 1987. Everybody knows that Comrade Polo [Division General Leopoldo Cintra Frias]—this is the nickname I gave him—had been in Angola for many years. When the situation became more complex, the High Command comrades thought that it would be inconsiderate to send Comrade Polo back to Angola and so they decided to send Ochoa. The situation was not very critical; it was getting worse but was not very critical.

I traveled to the USSR to attend the [celebration of] the 70th anniversary [of the Soviet revolution] in those days. The anniversary that year occurred on the date 7 November. I returned 2 to 3 days later, and between the 7th and the 15th, the situation grew extraordinarily worse because of the increasing South African onslaught and the danger that the concentration of Angolan troops in Cuito Cuanavale would be destroyed or annihilated.

At that moment, it was decided to send our best pilots as reinforcements. We decided to reinforce the troops on 15 November 1987. Everybody was asking us to help overcome that situation, which was very critical. Everybody was asking us to do something. We ourselves understood that even though we were in no way responsible for the errors that had led to that situation, we could not sit still

and allow a military and political catastrophe to occur over there. It was for this reason that on 15 November 1987 we decided to reinforce the troops in Angola and to take adequate steps to resolve that crisis.

At that time, we already had Ochoa as chief. However, we understood that the most adequate man for that mission was not Ochoa. He was not the most adequate man for the mission because of his character, lack of sufficient knowledge about the Angolans, and of relations with the Angolans. We looked for a solution which, to my judgment, was quite correct. Perhaps it would have been humiliating for Ochoa to be replaced by Polo; perhaps it would have looked like his qualities or capabilities were underestimated. What we decided to do then was to send Polo as chief of the Southern Front. The Southern Front is where the bulk of our forces were going to be accumulated, where combat would be held, and where the main operations would be carried out. We left Ochoa as chief of the mission and assigned Comrade Polo the task of heading the Southern Front because of its importance.

We therefore established direct contact with the Southern Front to exchange news and information and to send the High Command's instructions directly to the Southern Front. Nevertheless, we complied with the rules. Cables were sent to the chief of mission with instructions on what to do. The cables were later sent to the chief of mission and to the chief of the Southern Front. The cables were initially sent to Ochoa, but were later sent to Ochoa and Polo. I believe it is very important for all the State Council members to know about it, and you do, but—above all—it is important for the people to know how all the missions have been carried out.

I carefully went through the messages because I wanted to assess Ochoa's level of corruption—which we now know about—and his moral degeneration, [not to mention] the fact that when he went there he already had drug trafficking in mind; Jorge Martinez Valdez had already made a series of contacts and was already trying to get his Colombian passport. Ochoa knew all about this. How could this have exerted an influence on Ochoa's behavior? I sincerely believe that this had already exerted an influence on Ochoa's behavior.

When I considered the material that I was looking over, I realized that he deserved some criticism for the way he carried out his mission. I am obviously referring to the criticism that every chief must face. That is always necessary. There will always be problems and it will always be necessary to analyze everything and say: This was not done correctly; this should have been done this way instead. Any General Staff will always provide reasons for complaints.

I have been scrutinizing those messages, but I do not want to expand on this too much because it is not a matter of telling a story; it is a matter of reviewing what happened at the time and analyzing events to ascertain the gravity of what was being done in other sectors. It was known that Ochoa did not like to write reports during his missions. He was too lazy to write reports—that is the truth. There were complaints—and he was always reproached for this—that he seldom sat down to dictate a report during every mission that he carried out.

I remember that I sent him a cable on 2 December, when he had been there only 3 weeks. I will read paragraphs of the cables I have here, which contain a lot of material. There are more cables, but I will only read the essential ones so that the problem will be better understood. In one of the paragraphs , I asked him if he had sent some information regarding the instructions sent on the 30th; I was told that nothing had arrived, that he generally sent little information. I hope that such a custom will not prevail in this situation. That is what I told him on 12 December [date as heard.]

There is something else. Even though Ochoa was not in charge of directing the troops in southern Angola, where most of our men and our weapons were located, he did play a key role because he was in Luanda. The war was being waged by two Armies, the Angolan and the Cuban Armies, and many issues had to be coordinated with the Angolans, many problems had to be solved. A Center for the Direction of Operations [Centro de Direccion de Operaciones, [CDO] was established at which Soviet advisers, Cubans, and Angolans worked.

Obviously the Cubans, as can happen under any circumstances, did not always agree with the CDO's decisions. Ochoa was supposed to be there. One day, amid the crisis, it was reported that agreements had been reached at the CDO when the situtation at Cuito Cuanavale was critical. The report involved the movement of certain units, which were being taken from Cuito and Menongue because a new situation had arisen in central Angola caused by UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] actions supported by South African advisers.

In a cable dated 20 December, there is a paragraph where Ochoa is told: I am very angry over your unexpected, inexplicable ideas that clash with my concept of the struggle in the south against South Africa, which is fundamental in solving the problems created in Angola. On 21 December I sent another lengthy message. I believe that the release of all this material should be authorized when the history of this problem is written. The time for that has not yet come. However, in one paragraph I told Ochoa: I am unable to fully understand the reasons for your failure to attend the CDO meeting, which I have inferred from your cable. Important decisions were made at that meeting and Ochoa, apparently, was not present. This was on 21 December; complications in Cuito persisted, and our airplanes flew missions every day.

At about this time, a certain theory emerged—the theory was Ochoa's—that the South Africans had withdrawn, that there was no longer a crisis situation in Cuito, and that certain troop movements could be made. This was on 2 January 1988. I rejected this, Ochoa's first strategic proposal. I must also add that during his entire tenure as chief of mission, he made four strategic proposals, and they were all rejected. I have maps and plans with arrows pointing out directions; his four proposals were rejected by the General Staff. On four occasions he made strategic proposals, and none was accepted. One of these proposals involved Cuito, another involved the central part of the country, another involved advancing through the south, and yet another—made toward the end of his term as chief of mission—involved the establishment of positions. All four were rejected.

This one—and you can see the paragraph of a message sent on 12 January 1988—was his first proposal. In the message I told him: The situation in Cuito Cuanavale has not been resolved as yet, despite the optimistic signs you report. If the 58th and 10th Brigades are transferred from Menongue to Cuanza, only Cubans would be left in Menongue to make their way toward Cuito if the 58th Brigade suffered serious problems with its logistical mission. As long as South Africa's intentions are not totally clarified, there must be no thought of moving the 58th and 10th Brigades.

We could participate with the tactical group in the direction of Cuemba. This would force us to place another tactical group at the bridge crossing and to place the third group in Bie. None would be left in Huambo and we would be endangering the troops in two directions in the south.

Aside from the measures to be adopted in Luena, a difficult situation had also arisen in Luena, which grew worse after the idea was adopted to remove the two FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] from Menongue. One has to be very careful about taking steps that may destabilize what we have created in the south. Of course, there are other instructions here.

This was on the 12th. And do you know what happened on the 13th? A strong attack. It was the 13th or the 14th but this has to be precisely determined. It was an extremely heavy South African attack east of the river, along a very extensive front defended by three Angolan brigades—the 21st, the 59th, and the 25th—with a 5-km distance between the brigades. I must make it clear that up to the moment of the attack we did not have a single man in Cuito. That was when the crisis arose and the first thing we sent was advisers—experts in artillery, tanks, and other weapons—to help the Angolans to use those combat means at that time. We had not yet sent any units. The problem was very serious because there were 200 km of woods between Menongue, where our troops were located, and Cuito Cuanavale.

In view of this situation —the enemy having attacked and dislodged the 21st Brigade from its positions and threatening the two other brigades—we decided on the 14th to send a tactical group with a tank battalion, artillery, and the other weapons to cut directly across those two 200 km and reach Cuito Cuanavale. That was the day... [changes thought] The telegram I mentioned was sent on the 12th.

The force advanced and we sent a telegram on the 17th, which read in some paragraphs as follows: Here are some ideas about the defense of Cuito. You must analyze and try to either apply them the way we suggest or with any changes you may want to suggest. With the reinforcement from the tactical group and the 10th Brigade, that brigade advanced with our tactical group from Menongue to Cuito. With the reinforcement from the tactical group and the 10th Brigade we do not intend to cross the Cuito River to the east. The defense ring east of the river must be reduced, by withdrawing the 59th and 25th Brigades to well fortified positions closer to the river. These two brigades must cover the east flank in order to allow the 8th Brigade to resume its mission of carrying supplies. The 8th Brigade was Angolan.

Currently—we told them on 17 January—the positions of the 59th and 25th Brigades are very unsafe. They risk having their lines broken in the direction of the position where the 21st Brigade was located. We must stop running these risks. This was on 17 January, when what we might call our battle to readjust the lines east of the river began. Cuito Cuanavale... [changes thought] The true Cuito Cuanavale lies west but there were a number of brigades east of the river which depended on a bridge and we began fighting on the 17th to readjust the lines. I must point out that when we sent the tactical group we asked the president, we asked the Angolans... [begins again]. Actually, we asked the Angolans—this was supposed to be handled through the Angolan General Staff—to allow us to assume responsibility for defending Cuito.

Our Air Force was already playing a decisive role. We had already sent a tactical group by land. We had already committed our forces in that battle. We asked the Angolans to give us the responsibility for that battle. Our mission received instructions and reported that we were already responsible for the defense of Cuito. On 26 January 1988, we sent a cable. We sent cables almost every day. I have just selected some. In a portion of a cable we told him: I do not understand what is being done in Cuito. Who has the highest authority in Cuito? Often you do not bother to explain to us what is being done, despite the fact that we are not inflexible in our points of view and that we are always prepared to hear your opinion.

Those instructions were sent on the 17th and by the 26th nothing had been done. It was exasperating. It was decided that Ochoa should travel to Cuba. He arrived in Cuba on 31 January. We called him specifically to

discuss the situation in Cuito and everything that had to be done there. He left for Angola on 4 February, and he arrived there on the 5th. He was supposed to immediately exert efforts and overcome any resistance—if there was any—from our Angolan allies or from other advisers in order to readjust the frontlines. Days went by and the frontlines were not readjusted.

Meanwhile, we kept sending resources to Cuito Cuanavale. Listen to this: From here we were able to guess what was going to happen. On 12 January, I told him that the situation was not clear, that the danger was not over. On the 14th, the enemy launched a big offensive. In Angola the theory was that the enemy had already withdrawn. Ochoa returned to Angola on the 5th. He had instructions to readjust the line of battle east of the river, the line that was 18 km east of the river, almost beyond the reach of our artillery, with a 5 - km gap between brigades. Almost 1 month went by and the lines had not yet been readjusted. He returned on the 5th with the task of solving that problem. On 14 February, Saint Valentine's Day, the South Africans launched their big offensive. It was carried out against the 59th Brigade. The attackers broke through the lines and marched along the 5-km gap between the 21st and 59th brigades. The attackers began to surround the 59th Brigade. A very difficult situation emerged. They could have gone as far as the bridge and cut off three entire brigades.

This situation was prevented as a result of a violent counterattack by a combined Cuban-Angolan tank company. The enemy had to use more than 100 vehicles against this counterattack. This counterattack stopped the enemy. However, the company lost the seven tanks it had and 14 Cubans died as a result of this action which, of course, was nevertheless not in vain because it prevented a catastrophe and gave the 59th, the 25th, and the 21st brigades time to retreat.

On the 15th we sent Ochoa a message: We are awaiting news and more detailed information on what happened on the 14th east of Cuito. We want a report on Cuban casualties, and, if possible, on Angolan casualties, from the three brigades that retreated. We also want a report on the possible loss of equipment, artillery, etcetera. Further on I told him: Following the errors that have been committed and the time that has been wasted in making adjustments for the defense of Cuito, it is now necessary to have a cool head. One consistent attitude of yours has been to underestimate possible enemy actions. We must be more alert and more aware to avoid surprises and errors. I will not hide from you the fact that here we are bitter over what happened, because it had been foreseen and words of caution were issued on several occasions. We insisted on the readjustment of the frontlines for almost 1 entire month. What happened forced, of course, a readjustment.

On the 20th I sent him another message informing him: We have not received an answer to two important questions: How many tanks are in good enough condition to move east of the river? How many Angolan tanks are in good enough condition to move to the west? I am asking this because we are considering the suitability of reinforcing the east side with some Angolan tanks that have stayed west of the river so that the small force east of the river will have at least 10 or 12 tanks. You must be fully aware of the dangerous situation that exists east of the river. If the enemy breaks through the lines of defense, the Angolan forces will find themselves with their backs to the river and will face casualties from drowning, attacks, and the prisoners could be countless. This would be a catastrophe. If this happens, it will be very difficult to defend Cuito, and the political and moral consequences for the Angolan Armed Forces and the Angolan Government would be terrible.

The bridge that joined the east with the west had been destroyed. The enemy used unmanned aircraft [aviones automaticos] to destroy the bridge. On 21 February, we sent him another message which, among other things, stated: We cannot understand why things were going so slow in Cuito Cuanavale. A complete week has passed since the 14 February events, and, with the exception of only two battalions from the 21st brigade, we still have not gone to the west of the river. According to our estimates, approximately 3,500 Angolan soldiers remain on the other side of the river and a large amount of equipment has to be transferred to the west. The worst part is that, according to news received today, the bridge has been rendered totally useless because several sections have been destroyed, making the bridge virtually impossible to cross. We were also informed that three rolls of rope are going to be sent to Cuito tomorrow, Monday. What will happen if tomorrow the enemy breaks through the lines and uses all its strength against the river area?

We have lost many days and cannot understand how our instructions or simply our points of view are conveyed to our people in Cuito. We do not know who the person responsible for receiving and implementing our instructions is. We do not even know if our instructions or points are view are known over there. Something is wrong with the line of communications for passing on our orders. I am basing my instructions on your information that whatever happens there is our responsibility.

It also seems to us that adequate precautions are not being taken in the area. The area commanders are not aware of the political, military, and moral consequences that a disastrous confrontation with the forces that are to the east of the river could cause. These forces would not even have a few ships to do something comparable to what the British did with its fleet in Dunkirk. Under these conditions, I believe that Polo should remain in Cuito until the most serious problems are resolved. I sent him an urgent message giving him these orders.

It is my belief that the formula proposed in the message I sent yesterday should be adopted without any hesitancy, that is, a heavily fortified defensive position using an amount of soldiers not to exceed the size of a brigade,

which should be maintained at the eastern section of the river. The lines of defense should be widespread and the available tanks should be positioned at the rearguard. I hope that tonight the artillery, the scant transportation vehicles available, and the remaining personnel from the 21st and 8th Brigades will start to be passed to that side of the river. We insisted and insisted that the equipment be passed to this side, that all the artillery be sent to the east side of the river, that our lines be reduced there, and, in short, that all the necessary measures that had to taken under those circumstances were in fact taken.

Polo, in fact, went there and solved the problem. He adjusted the lines, and, from that moment on, all South African attacks came up against the defensive position along the east side of the river. As soon as they began to get near, they would be hit by artillery—which was located to the west and could be supplied with ammunition more easily—they would encounter antiaircraft attacks, they would walk onto mined fields, and they several times crashed headlong into the defensive position which they were never able to conquer. During this period we had almost no casualties. The casualties were minimal and the enemy crashed against our positions. Cuito Cuavanale became a trap for the enemy.

What was happening at that time? Martinez was taking steps to put his travel plans in order. He was getting his passport. He was making contacts at that time. Well, how long did this critical situtation last [in Angola]?

General Lorente was sent to Cuito Cuanavale on 6 March. He was to take command of the Southern Front in Lubango. On 6 March, our forces were ordered to advance south along the right flank. The most important of all strategical operations had begun while the enemy was launching attacks in Cuito Cuanavale. I must also note that all these actions carried out in Cuito Cuanavale took place under constant bombing of South African long-range artillery, which fired thousands of projectiles at that location during the months Cuito Cuanavale was under siege. All the actions I mention were carried out amid the incessant bombing of South African artillery.

However, we had already successfully prevented the enemy from occupying Cuito Cuanavale, stopped them, wore them out, and had begun our advance toward the right flank. The order to advance was issued on the 6th [corrects himself], rather on 10 March; the troops started to march south. That was also a very important and critical period, because our scouting parties began to fight against South African scouting parties. There were a number of clashes, and I recall that we waged another battle during that period: in Cuito Cuanavale it was to readjust the lines of battle; in the south we were going against Ochoa's idea that infantry or scouting parties should advance on foot.

After analyzing certain aspects of the terrain, including the lack of water and the long distances involved, we advocated using vehicles in our scouting operations—that is, that we should not send troops 50 or 60 km from their bases without a vehicle being at least 8 or 10 km away from the troops in the scouting parties, because traveling in vehicles offers advantages and disadvantages. I argued that we should seize both the advantages of exploring on foot and in vehicles. At any rate, that is another long story.

Regarding this period, I will refer to something that was happening in June. What was happening in June? June was a critical month. Our troops were approaching the border. Our closest airfields were in Lubango and Matala, 250 km away. They were hardly being used then; they could not be used. That is why on 22 March we began to build an airport in Cuito Cuanavale [corrects himself], rather in Cahama. That was on 22 March. We sent Ochoa a very brief cable that read as follows: What is needed and how long would it take to make the Cahama runway operational for fighter planes if we worked at full speed? The battle then began. Polo took control of the undertaking and collected all the equipment he could. We sent him new equipment from Cuba, including trucks, bulldozers, and haulers, that is, all the means necessary to build this aiport rapidly and at full speed, which was another great accomplishment. We built it in a few weeks. The airport's first runway was ready and a second one was being built by June. In June, it was already operational. I will further elaborate on the airports later because an important issue pertains to the airports.

What was the situation on 7 June 1988? I have a cable that summarizes everything. I was hesitant as to whether I should read it because it contains some plans we had at that time. However, I believe that I will read it because it demonstrates that the peace process had advanced significantly and had become irreversible. We had received word about a possible massive South African surprise air attack against our advance units. I sent a cable to Ochoa and Polo: News of a possible South African surprise air attack against Cuban - Angolan troops should not be underestimated. It made some sense. Our troops must heavily protect their shelters. Antiaircraft units must be in a state of maximum alert, particularly at dawn, at dusk, and during the daytime. Study possible defensive actions by placing Air Force planes on guard duty in Cahama. Be ready to counterattack with as many aircraft as possible to completely destroy Ruacana water reservoirs and transformers. This must be implemented as soon as possible after an attack.

Plans also should be prepared to hit (Ochicata) and nearby air bases as a response to the attack and according to the size of the enemy action. The Cahama group and everything that is available will have to be used for this. Do not wait for orders—just look at the powers he had—to carry out the action if there is a strong enemy attack against our troops. Our attack must be sudden and quick. I reiterate the need for the troops to be on maximum alert and protected; make maximum use of antiaircraft weapons. The Pechora de Matala Regiment

should get there as soon as possible, preferably at night so that there can be groups in Humbe and Cahama. Keep the tactical group at this point. The Tchipa personnel should be particularly on the alert. The planned movements should be carried out bearing in mind these risks. Decisive events may soon be taking place. I repeat: Decisive events may soon be taking place. This was on 7 June.

That same day, I wrote Jose Eduardo [Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos]. There was always—and this is something I must stress—there was coordination, an exchange of letters, between Jose Eduardo and myself. There was close coordination. Every step taken by our troops was reported to him. Every strategic operation was coordinated with the Angolans. I had already sent him other letters on this issue.

I told him: Dear Comrade Jose Eduardo: As you know, our intelligence services have received reports that the South Africans are planning a massive surprise air attack against the Angolan-Cuban troops in southern Angola. There is a certain logic to this report, if we take into consideration the despair of the South Africans in the face of the defeats and failures they have sustained, both in the military as well as in the diplomatic fields. They might try their luck in changing the correlation of forces by using their Air Force so they will sustain the least possible number of white casualties. Early this morning, we sent a message to Ochoa and Polo warning them not to underestimate the reports. We told them to place all the forces on a state of maximum alert, to take all security measures, and to have our aircraft ready to take off and repel the attack.

We notified the Soviets of the intelligence reports indicating that there could be a quick and immediate response to any sudden, surprise, massive air attack launched by the enemy. We were warning everyone of the danger of the possibility that we might have to launch a strong attack in northern Namibia. All possible measures were taken to protect the personnel and the technical equipment; all air defensive measures were taken. As the troops advanced toward the south, more and more groups were being sent from Cuba, full regiments with antiaircraft rockets. Therefore, we became completely superior in antiaircraft rockets and we became superior in air attacks. What happened? What happened [repeats himself]? The South Africans began to move forces. At a certain time they tried—just like they were doing in Cuito with their artillery—to begin shooting cannons.

One day—I believe it was on the 26th, yes, 26 June—they launched 200 missiles against Tchipa, where our forces were. We then sent a cable to Ochoa and Polo: We must respond to today's artillery attack against Tchipa. We believe that the first step must be a strong air attack against the camp, military installations, and South African personnel in Calueque and its environs. We must do the best we can to prevent the loss of civilian lives. If the enemy's artillery can be located, strike it harshly. Other kinds of attacks must also be prepared in the event that circumstances dictate other types of responses. As a possible future step, we must decide whether to strike the military bases first and leave the Ruacana hydroelectric complex for later, or vice versa. Troops should also be on the alert against any land attack against Tchipa. Let us know what you plan to do with the 85th Tactical Group, and under what conditions you would send it to Tchipa. You must accelerate the construction of shelters in Cahama and the new landing strip. This happened on the 26th.

The attack against Calueque took place on the 27th, and it was quite a destructive attack. We were waiting to see what would happen next. I sent Ochoa and Polo a cable on 27 June: Within the next few hours or days, we must be on a maximum state of alert, awaiting any possible response from the enemy. You must be ready to strike hard against the enemy bases in northern Namibia. In other words, you must have a response ready in the event of a massive enemy air attack. In this regard, you must analyze how, with more forces, you could annihilate the enemy. There must always be a point at which you will simply use the most available means. The Ruacana hydroelectric complex will not change location. Therefore, it will be there when it is its turn, sooner or later, depending on the various situations that might arise. However, it is logical to believe that if the enemy action is serious, we must first attack the military targets.

We have given them our initial response. Now it is up to them to decide what to do and if they should continue the escalation.

On the 27th the South Africans raised a big fuss over the attack, but they restrained themselves militarily. Our response had been quite strong. We felt that the hydroelectric complex was going to acquire strategic importance. They did not have water from Calueque, but they had water from Ruacana. We had drafted the plans according to the situation. We would hit them at one or the other point, depending on the enemy action. This was on 10 June.

In September or October, when it is said that we were engaging in all those black market operations, what happened? Had peace arrived? Peace had not arrived.

Here we have a message dated 10 October 1988 in which I told Ochoa and Polo: The negotiations have reached an impasse. The South African demands are unacceptable. Because great concessions had been made in Brazzaville, we took an inflexible position in New York. Although there is talk of new meetings in Brazzaville, we must not lend too much importance to the matter. We must prepare for the impasse, although I do not think the South Africans want to resume hostilities. We must remain alert, especially to guard against the risk of air attacks. We must prepare for rainy season. Just as we told Ochoa and Polo, the frontline units must remain in

Calueque and Ruacana. The brigade in Donguena and the brigade located between Tchipa and Ruacana must be withdrawn. A joint Cuban-Angolan unit can remain in Tchipa. The remainder of the troops must retreat to the Cahama-Xangongo line. The antiaircraft units must be deployed along the Cahama-Mucope-Humbe-Xangongo line. We must not lose time. Our aircraft must be prepared to support the frontline units in Calueque, Ruacana, and Tchipa. The Calueque and Ruacana Dams must be blown up if the enemy attacks our frontline units. We did not leave many troops there, as supplying them was difficult, and it was almost rainy season. Frontline units remained there, but they were instructed to blow up the dams if they were attacked. The political work must be directed at increasing the troops' combat readiness and at preparing for the impasse. According to reports by Western diplomats, the South Africans have concentrated large military forces in Namibia. We must try to confirm this. Our duty is to be prepared for any outcome. This struggle will be won by the side that has the best ability to resist.

These messages will give you and the people an exact idea of what was happening in Angola all those months, both in the initial phase of the crisis and in the final phase. All of those messages I am referring to discussed the fighting in the south and the movements of Cuban personnel—Cubans mixed with Angolan and SWAPO [South West African People's Organization] fighters. Sometimes they were Cuban-SWAPO units, and at other times they were Cuban-Angolan units when we expected decisive, large battles.

In fact these large battles did not occur because our troops were quite strong. The enemy realized that we were very powerful and had taken security measures such as the construction of the airport and the reinforcement of our available air strength and antiaircraft weapons. I believe that this was the key to success, the achievement of the fundamental objectives without sacrificing thousands of lives. If great battles had to be waged, they were waged because there was no other alternative. The idea, however, was to achieve objectives with the minimum number of casualties, which we were successful in doing. The idea was to always be in a state of readiness, always foreseeing all dangers, and situations that might arise.

At that time, comrades, we must not forget that when these things were happening, when thousands of projectiles struck Cuito Cuanavale—because the siege of Cuito Cuanavale lasted many months—when the men were preparing for decisive actions, when approximately 40,000 Cuban troops were mobilizing in the south and preparing for that decisive battle, Martinez was meeting here with some Colombian drug traffickers, later with some Mexican drug traffickers, and finally with de la Guardia's people, and the people in his group, organizing drug trafficking operations. In April and May he was meeting with Escobar in Colombia. In June—which is the time to which these cables refer, this was the time of the Calueque events—they were waiting for a ship with 2 tons of drugs, a ship that was supposed to arrive 2 months after the meeting.

It is impossible to forget this. It is difficult for us to forget this because we experienced this drama, these risks, this struggle; we lived it day by day. We received the news of every man that fell during a battle or during a mission—people who died in battle, or in a mine field, or in an accident. We heard about this every day. We felt responsible for each of those men's lives. We felt responsible for all of those men, for each one of them, for the 50,000 men.

We were virtually in charge of the government [not further identified] in 1988. We were in charge of the government from mid-November until the end of that year. We devoted all our time, all our time [repeats himself] to that struggle, to the war. It could not have been otherwise. We had to take responsibility for whatever happened there. Even the revolution was at stake there, because if this was a decisive battle against apartheid representing a defeat of large proportions, it was also a battle for the revolution, which could have meant a huge defeat for the revolution no matter how noble, just, or altruistic our cause. I think that even the revolution was at stake in that battle. We did not even attend to government affairs; at least I did not attend to them. The central government was also working on this. I devoted at least 80 percent of my time to this battle. We set aside fundamental matters in view of the graveness of the situation that had arisen there.

There is no doubt—and this will be historically documented for the glory of our fatherland, our party, and our heroic combatants—that a situation that had seemed hopeless was mastered and peace was attained. This is precisely why it happened: Because the efforts of the party and the Armed Forces High Command were completely devoted to this task. If it became necessary to send a ship, to load a ship, the High Command took less than 2 hours to get that ship ready. If it became necessary to deploy a group of missile experts, they would do it. We must point out that we had a wonderful commodity: our people's enthusiasm, our people's heroic spirit, our people's generosity. These are the same people who today demand justice. All of them went there—workers, peasants, those who were part of the Armed Forces reserves, conscripts who volunteered. Each combatant who went to Angola went there as a volunteer.

At the same time that we were inscribing the most glorious page in our history, the most shameful page in our history was being written precisely by the chief of the military mission in that country. There is a factor that must be analyzed here, by which I mean the history of the black market deals, allegedly made to help the troops. Gentlemen: Do you believe that it is possible to help an army of 50,000, to build an airport in 6 or 7 weeks by collecting kwanzas at the candonga [black market]? Who

would believe that story? That is the most ridiculous thing one could ever hear. Here is a message that was once sent: What would be required and how long would it take to convert the Cahama landing strip into a runway for fighter planes if we worked at full speed? That was just a question. Just tell us what is necessary and how long it will take and we will send all that we have here, as we did so that the Cahama [landing strip] could be built.

If it is a matter of building the Catumbela and Cabo Ledi [landing strips], we will also use every means and resource the country has available, because the country gave top priority to the war in Angola. We even sent candy to the soldiers. There was not a single day that I did not ask the High Command how many tons of candies, cookies, or chocolate had been sent to the soldiers, how were the soldiers doing, what kind of nylons [as heard] they had, how were they sleeping, what kind of mattresses they had, what kind of food they ate. Everything the country had was available to them. How many bags of cement? Sixty thousand.

I still remember when the High Command asked about the ship, how many bags were on each ship, when the ship was leaving, and whether or not there was enough paper for the bags that had to be sent to Angola. We also asked how many ships were leaving, as well as many questions pertaining to Angola. We wondered: Would it be better to send asphalt from Cuba or buy it in Portugal, Europe, anywhere where we could get it faster, paying for it what we could.

If everything we had was available for that front, for the battle, and if I said: We must set up an ice cream factory in southern Coppelia, then we set up an ice cream factory in southern Coppelia so that the troops could have everything they needed. Right, that was our concern—Did they have medicine, equipment, shoes, everything? This was the High Command's main concern. We were worried about the material needs of the troops, and we were willing to send the entire resources of the country to Angola, what we had and what we did not have [as heard].

How can one fight a war by gathering kwanzas? That was simply a pretext to cover up the theft of money and resources. This, unfortunately, is the truth; it is very sad, but it is the truth—the front's needs were used as an excuse. In the zones of operation, they were authorized to barter, but not to engage in black market activities. The zones of operations were the cattle areas. Peasants had their herds there. However, because of the war, they had no resources. Peasants were not interested in money; they were interested in obtaining merchandise.

Consequently, the command was authorized to barter in that area. It was legal and the Angolans knew that; everyone knew that. Bartering could be carried out on the battlefront. In the south, troops bartered sugar, salt, or any other foodstuff for other things that the peasants had. We did not steal a single lamb, goat, or cow from any peasant in the area. We paid for everything, but we paid in the only way we could—with merchandise. What Ochoa did, in a subtle way, was to barter, using the excuse that he had to solve problems or meet needs. He did this based on the idea that he was authorized to do it in the zones of operation.

This probably did not draw too much attention. It is understandable that some officers would be confused if he told them that his bartering was to cover troops' needs or to build the airport. Had he truly done that, he still would have been wrong. It was incorrect to have engaged in black market activities. It was incorrect to have sent an officer, or a captain to carry sacks and sell them for kwanzas on the black market. It would not be so bad if this money was to be used in the war, but that was not actually the case. Saying that this was done to help the troops was merely a pretext. It is possible that Ochoa turned in a few kwanzas, but in an amount insufficient even to build a square meter of the airport. We know how an airport is built and how it is built during a war. The airport was used as a pretext to engage in more operations. We saw how the money from these operations wound up in Cuba, and, from Cuba, in an account in Panama.

There is no justification for this. How could we get involved in black market operations there, even if it were for the troops' sake? How could we get involved in the black market if we were receiving $20 million per year for technical civilian cooperation? This cooperation was being paid for at a very high price. We had thousands of men over there. We received $20 million for civilian, not military, cooperation. Nothing was ever paid for the military cooperation. We had thousands of workers there, including teachers and doctors. The country received approximately $20,000, charging a good price... [corrects himself] $20 billion... [corrects himself] $20 million. That was a low price; foreign experts in Angola charged four or five times more than our experts charged.

However, considering Angola's economic problems and the difficulties it faced in 1983, in the wake of Cangamba and after Cangamba [not further identified], when Jose Eduardo [Dos Santos] visited Cuba, we asked him not to pay us anything for the technical cooperation. We told him that we would continue to offer technical cooperation. In the past 6 years, we have not received $120 million to which we were entitled. [This shows] how a country makes sacrifices in its internationalist efforts. This shows how sacrifices were made in the area of technical cooperation. I am not speaking of sacrificing a life; I am not speaking of the blood of our nation's children, which cannot be repaid with any amount of money in the world. If we were even donating civilian cooperation, how can it make any sense to have engaged in black market operations in Angola? This cannot be explained. This has no justification whatsoever.

Well, later on, things were happening here. There was this business concerning the account in Panama—this is very important; this is very serious. How was the Panama account opened? It was opened with ill-gotten money. The Panama account was opened with stolen money. The $200,000 Martinez had was ill-gotten money. Money was stolen from the Nicaraguans, and money was kept there; that was how the account was opened. Money was stolen from the Angolans, for they handed over money to buy communications equipment. The communications equipment was obtained at a lower price and they [the defendants] kept whatever was left and placed that money in the account in Panama. They stole from Angola on the black market, but they also stole from Cuba. If they were trading cement for anything there, that cement still belonged to Cuba.

Moreover, when one is at war, a sack of cement cannot be sold, because one does not know when cement might be needed to build fortifications, bridges, and so on. Cement is a strategical resource. It should not be sold. Sugar was sent from Cuba and exchanged for certain things. Some sugar was indeed delivered, because that was the way to cover up certain activities, but proceeds from the rest were pocketed. In other words, they robbed Nicaragua and Angola in two ways: through communications equipment and the black market. They also robbed Cuba, because the products involved belonged to Cuba. Therefore, the bank account in Panama was the result of four robberies.

There is something else: We did not know why Ochoa sent arms from Angola to Panama. We asked ourselves: That is strange. Why did he send, among other things, rifles to that country... [corrects himself]. Excuse me, I meant to say from Angola to Nicaragua. We asked ourselves: What does that mean? We were unable to come up with an answer. However, we recently received a report from the Sandinist People's Army [EPS] explaining why Ochoa sent those arms. You will fully understand why.

I hope that I will cause no harm to the Nicaraguans by revealing certain information contained in this report pertaining to arms operations. The confidential report reads as follows: In early 1987, Ochoa told the EPS chief of General Staff that he was fully capable of supplying any Western military equipment—his deviousness is obvious here—that the EPS might need to strengthen military operations against mercenary forces. He apparently managed to obtain certain pieces of small equipment. When he did so, Ochoa claimed that he was able to supply any Western weapon required.

The reports adds: In this context, on 12 March 1986, Major General Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo agreed with Division General Arnaldo Ochoa, who was Cuba's FAR representative in Nicaragua at the time, to purchase 100 German-made M-79 grenade launchers and 12,000 projectiles. Ochoa accepted the order. The report continues: Maj Gen Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo, through the EPS finance office, handed over $120,000 to Ochoa's assistant, Jorge Martinez Valdes, who was a FAR captain at the time. On 5 March 1987, Martinez received another $41,000, that is, a total of $161,000.

The EPS report states: Months later, following Ochoa's instructions, Martinez told Maj Gen Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo that the transaction was canceled, because prospective suppliers were facing problems delivering that order in Nicaraguan territory. This agreement never materialized, and Maj Gen Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo understood that the deal had been temporarily suspended when Martinez told him that it was impossible to honor the deal, that the advance payment had been lost, and that he could not return that payment due to problems inherent to this kind of transaction.

The report adds: On 22 September 1988, Arnaldo Ochoa, in his new capacity as head of the Cuban military mission in Angola, told the EPS through Brigadier General Nestor Lopez Cuba—who replaced Ochoa as head of the Cuban Military Mission in Nicaragua—that Ochoa would send the following weapons from Angola to Nicaragua: Fifty Yugoslav AK rifles, 200 rifle magazines, 50 magazine clips, 50 bayonets, 50 belts, 50 accessory containers, 50 oilers, 4 60-mm mortars, 2,664 50-mm mortar shells, 560 antipersonnel grenades, and 2,016 40-mm ammunition for M-79 grenade launchers. Nicaragua received all these armaments in 1988, which the EPS believed Ochoa had sent them in partial compensation for having failed to honor the aforementioned agreement.

We must add that 2,016 grenades must cost a lot on the arms market—on the arms black market. They can easily charge $100 each. Thus, 2,016 grenades can cost about $200,000. Mortar shells are also expensive. To tell the truth, the value on the black market of the weapons he sent was equal to or perhaps even more than the money Ochoa received for them.

This report ends with the following paragraph: We were never informed by Ochoa or Martinez that the money was safe and had been deposited in a bank account in Panama. We had already given it up as lost. The report says: We were never advised that money had been placed in a bank account.

Everything is very clear here. What happened? They were given $120,000 and then $41,000. The initial $120,000 was given to the supplier, who, at the end, told them he could not carry out the operation and returned $75,000, leaving them with a $45,000 loss. But, the would-be supplier did return $75,000 which, when added to the $41,000, amounted to the $116,000 they had in the account. What did they think up then? They got the idea of obtaining in Angola—I do not know if they requested this materiel, if somebody gave it to them, or if they stole it—mortar shells and M-79 grenades; they sent the arms to Nicaragua to partially fulfill the commitments they had made; and they kept the

money. They kept $116,000 from this operation and they had about $40,000-$50,000 they had to return to the Angolans. They then had about $160,000 in the account, and they increased the amount to $200,000 by adding money obtained from their black stockmarket operations.

We can clearly see where the money came from. They were stealing from everybody to increase their bank account. The money had not yet come from drugs.

It is not necessary for me to repeat information everybody knows, such as the operations carried out by Martinez, his trip to Colombia, and the meeting with Escobar. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that one of the most serious actions—I would say even more serious than the story of the account in Panama and the origins of the money deposited in that account—was to have sent a Cuban Armed Forces officer to Colombia with a false passport and placed him in enemy hands. This occurred when we were on the verge of decisive battles in Angola. We were risking everything over there; we were risking the revolution. This action was extremely serious.

What other action is so serious? It was not precisely discussing and organizing plans for the shipment, initially in commercial ships and later in planes, of large amounts of drugs through Cuba. He conspired to do all this, but he never managed to carry out any of these operations. This is what is so serious: Knowing that a mafia had been formed in the Interior Ministry's [MININT] MC Department [department in charge of contravening U.S. embargo] that was drug trafficking, he joined this mafia and asked for its cooperation in everything: to help Martinez travel to Colombia, to help Martinez ignore all MINFAR regulations, and to help Martinez come and go whenever he wanted and without anybody's knowledge.

He also asked him for cooperation to engage in large-scale drug operations. He joined the group and, in the end, wound up receiving $50,000 from the group from the last drug-trafficking operation. He requested $100,000 and was given $50,000. It is very serious that a hero of the republic, a member of the Central Committee, a division general, a chief of the most glorious mission being carried out by the country abroad, should join that mafia, that group of gangsters, without immediately reporting it, but instead joining this group..

One asks why this group became so bold? This group started out with operations that were spaced out; they were cautious. In 1988, the group suddenly carried out 50 percent of the operations in 4 months. In a single month, it engaged in five or six operations. Why? Undoubtedly, when these people saw Ochoa return from Angola—Ochoa, who was on his way to becoming the commander of the Western Army; Ochoa, who demanded as a defense necessity that the DAAFAR [Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force] and the Western Navy be assigned to him, as is the case in the eastern region—these people must have felt they were the people with the most impunity in the world. It must have stimulated and encouraged them a lot that a member of the Central Committee, a hero, a division general, and a man with Ochoa's prestige was involved in this. I believe this is extremely serious.

Despite the difficulties, Ochoa did not let up; he did not let up in his plans. He had plans to carry out operations until April 1989. We learned this from all the evidence we have gathered. He persisted in the idea of large-scale operations. He persisted in the idea of using a merchant ship to go to the northern coast carrying 10 tons, which would later be picked up by boats. He talked a lot with Tony de la Guardia. Tony de la Guardia, who had been cautious, conducting spaced-out operations until 1988, told him that it was impossible to carry out that large operation with the boatmen—who are not very serious people, who come and go, who immediately begin enjoying any money they collect—and that it was impossible to transfer 10 tons of cocaine. He argued a lot with Tony de la Guardia about all these problems. He insisted a lot on it; it was an idea, which if we look at it, was totally crazy.

I tried to figure out how much was needed to obtain the sum he mentioned. In his fantasy, he spoke of billions. I tried to figure out how much was needed for him to obtain $4 billion, which he said he was going to obtain and then invest in Cuba from abroad. This is what our prosecutor called a big plan, a big money-laundering operation. I figured he needed to have 400 ship voyages at $1,000 per kilo. He needed 400 ship voyages and 8,000 boat voyages, supposing that each boat carried 500 kg—these figures reminded me of the foreign debt figure—to amass $4 billion. It was a fantasy and there was a lack of reality. But those were his ideas. What is serious is that he harbored these ideas while he knew he was going to assume responsibility for the Western Army.

Naturally, when Ochoa returned from Angola, very few things about him were known. However, I must stress that if there is one institution that knows what people are doing, it is MINFAR, because it has the means and the necessary organization to control the men. I already explained before how the operations in Angola were disguised as war necessities and how he had confused his closest collaborators.

When Ochoa came here, he began to discuss business. Everytime he met with Raul, he wanted to talk about business. He was constantly given the same advice: Do not do it. He kept talking about allegedly serious business deals. Sometimes he would say some foolish things. Everyone took it as a joke, because he had made a habit of talking seriously and of joking. Whenever he said anything foolish, the people laughed. MINFAR and Raul would tell him: Just go about your military tasks and forget about business. That is not your task or mission. You must devote yourself to your military tasks; that is what you must do.

However, when it came to the drug problem, Ochoa told one, only one, of these officers. He told only one officer about that grave and serious activity that caused repulse, scandal, indignation, and concern. It is quite possible that if he had told four officers about this, it would have been inevitably known, because MINFAR has its organization—the military counter intelligence. I know for a fact how military counter intelligence works. Ochoa talked with only one officer. Very little was known about Ochoa, just some moral aspects and no criminal aspects. At any rate, these were not penal crimes but moral crimes. Reports about Ochoa's behavior were starting to come in from various sources.

The more serious thing is that he told only one officer about the drug involvement. He had corrupted this officer and won him over for this bad cause. The rest of his actions or his plans were supported by the Tony de la Guardia group. However, at one time he said this group was not capable, that they were stupid, that he was going to act on his own, etc. However, he insisted on carrying out the big operations with drugs up until this group practically disintegrated. In other words, he insisted on this from 1986 through nearly the middle of 1989, and that is the truth of the matter we have been able to detect.

As someone said here, the Tony de la Guardia group is a different case. Tony de la Guardia is not a hero, a member of the Central Committee, a division general, or someone who had Ochoa's responsibilities. Tony de la Guardia's case is extremely grave. I do not mean to say it is not as grave as Ochoa's case. What I am saying is De la Guardia's case is different from Ochoa's case; it has very grave conotations and is very treacherous and dangerous. If Ochoa was not able, did not have the time, was not successful, or did not manage to carry out any of his drug operations, these people had already carried out some of them. When Martinez visited Escobar, Tony de la Guardia and his group had been carrying out drug operations for 1 and ½ years.

All of this has been publicly debated, and it has been proven. They claimed they had noble purposes. All of them claimed noble purposes. Ochoa said he wanted to solve the development problems—that has nothing to do with what he did with the money—and the others said they wanted to help the country. To help the country in that way—as they have said—was to stab a knife in the back of the country. All of you have referred to that topic here. There is no reason for me to expand on this point. Later I will refer to this for other reasons.

Tony de la Guardia formed a totally repulsive gang within MININT. How it was formed is truly incredible, inconceivable, and very difficult to explain. How was all this possible? They were very secretive, of course. They knew what they were doing was very serious, but the way they carried out their actions was also very treacherous. The fact is that the cancer was formed. How was it discovered? It was discovered through the Ochoa case.

Who could imagine Ochoa would be involved in this type of activity? Who could imagine a MININT department was involved in these activities? However, it was already being investigated. Why was it being investigated?

As has already been proven, these people apparently carried out very few operations—only five in 1987. These operations were spaced out and held every 2 or 3 months. In 1988, they carried out two successful and three foiled operations. In 1989, I believe they carried out nine operations, one of which was a marijuana operation near the northern coast of Pinar del Rio.

Campaigns against Cuba had been ongoing, as Comrade Chomy [not further identified] has recalled. Naturally, our first reaction—accustomed as we were to all the lies, defamations, and slanders we have heard in this 30-year span—was simply to reject them as another invention, another lie by the United States, and not to pay any special attention to them.

Chomy recalled that some time in February 1988, there was a big campaign against us with charges and statements that even mentioned Raul. They made charges against him, which really angered us.

At that time, we were already in the phase of making contacts for these Angolan negotiations, and Cuba was actively participating in the Angolan peace negotiations. Therefore, a few comrades had made contacts with U.S. representatives during these events. I recall that I instructed Vice Foreign Minister Comrade Alarcon to strongly protest to one of the U.S. officials about the anti-Cuban campaign being implemented. I have the report here. If you want, I will read a small part of it: the part that says what Alarcon told the U.S. high official when he protested the charges against Cuba and the charges and attempts made to mix Raul in this rubbish. I am only going to read a paragraph and will say a very harsh word, because I have no other choice but to say it. I did not say these words, but I told Alarcon to say them.

The paragraph in Alarcon's report says: Following instructions from the commander in chief, I told this official—I am not going to give his name—that those who promoted and implemented these charges against us were sons of bitches. This was the diplomatic word used in the conversation between Alarcon and the U.S. official. It reflected our anger over this campaign which we believed to be totally slanderous. They were partially slanderous because they used names of persons who are government leaders. In this case, since we were involved in the Angolan negotiations, we believed this was an ill-intentioned campaign.

The U.S. State Department officials stated that these campaigns were not being carried out by the State Department but that the reports had come from the Justice Department. They stated they really had nothing

to do with this campaign and did not want us to believe it was an ill-intentioned campaign carried out by the State Department or the U.S. Government.

Today we know these gentlemen had been carrying out operations since early 1987; they had been operating for more than a year. Although everything seems to point to the fact that the first air shipment was made in April 1987, they had begun preparatory trips to coordinate these operations since January.

I thought the reason for the charges against Raul was the presence of an Armed Forces officer during a meeting with Escobar. Whoever Martinez represented during the meeting with Escobar was left up in the air. However, from what he said, it would be surmised—without his clearly specifying that he represented this or that person—that he acted in such a way that he was a representative of the Cuban Government. We have evidence that at the meeting there, they believed Martinez was a Cuban Government envoy, although they were not sure. They were not certain of this. However, Martinez attended the meeting, thus leaving that up in the air. I thought the presence of an officer was the cause for those charges. Afterwards, when we were studying the trial, and when we later were studying the documents, I realized that these charges were being leveled even before Martinez visited Colombia.

This is perfectly logical and clear. Why? If these people met the plane together with the so-called Ruiz—a relative of Miguel Ruiz Poo—in Santa Clara, which is a military base; if the first cocaine shipment was unloaded at the Varadero airport, and they went to the small military area at that airport; and if the landing of a plane had to be authorized by the antiaircraft defense, one sees all these things are possible, perfectly possible.

If these people arrived there and reported they were going to receive someone, perhaps a prominent businessman, or if they said someone very important for their activities at the ministry is arriving and requested the FAR's cooperation, it is logical for the FAR to immediately provide such cooperation.

The plane could have landed in Holguin, Guantanamo, or any other place. Flight permits are automatically granted; in fact, we do not know how many planes fly over our country. Procedures must be followed and authorities must be notified. When these people notified others that they had to welcome someone, perhaps a prominent businessman, and that a plane was going to land, they were automatically given the permit. Who was going to think these bandits were actually requesting landing permission for a plane trafficking or bringing drugs?

However, if they came, they did not come through the Rancho Boyeros airport; they came through Santa Clara on the first trip and landed in the military area on the second trip. Thus, it is logical for the Yankees to think that the Armed Forces had to know something about that operation and, with evil intentions of course, had to involve Raul's name in this problem. Those charges were made long ago, based on the activities by Tony de la Guardia's group.

Before we continue, it is also necessary to reflect on this. What was the U.S. attitude? Today, we already know the United States had the names of at least two people, which is something these two people have already admitted in their own testimony. One of them was Tony de la Guardia and the second was Miguel Ruiz Poo. They themselves said they had recordings of the talks held in Panama between one of their agents and Mr Ruiz Poo. It is possible they may have had more names of officers involved in this activity. If they saw the coastguard and the various movements, perhaps they thought this activity was authorized by the government.

More than the accusation itself, what is irritating is the idea that this country could sell itself for the few miserable dollars Tony de la Guardia and his group collected. For a group of people it could be enough, but for a country it is something insignificant. It is tiny. It is complete filth. The U.S. Government's opinion on the Cuban revolution does not matter. It is not possible that they believe Cuba could solve any problem with that filth. How much did they collect the 1st year? A million and something dollars. The 2d year they collected another million and something. The 3d year they had a higher rate, perhaps 3 million.

It is estimated that these gentlemen collected approximately $3.5 million. They still owed them money, which I suppose always happens in this kind of activity.

What does $2 million represent for a country that exports billions of dollars in sugar, nickel, farm and industrial products, etcetera? We are talking about billions of dollars per year. Consequently, regardless of what the Americans think of the revolution, it is not possible for them to have believed that this country could be sold for 4 [figure as heard] miserable dollars.

I know that the country cannot be sold for any amount of money. It is unfeasible and unacceptable to have a revolution that is dependent on drug trafficking. Even it if were thousands of millions of dollars, it would be unacceptable for a revolution in this hemisphere, 90 miles away from the United States, that maintains itself on its principles, morals, and seriousness to do this. If they want to, let them accuse us of being revolutionaries, of helping revolutionary movements, and of carrying out internationalist missions. Let them accuse us of whatever they want to in the revolutionary area. But to think that this country is a country of such little ambition that it would try to solve its problems with that miserable money is almost an insult to the common sense and intelligence of the leaders of our country and revolution.

What the Americans did was not right. They could have somehow sent a message to us. They could have said: We have the names of two people who are involved in drug trafficking. But they kept quiet. If it was a charge made at a trial, we would not have paid much attention to it, because those are charges made by criminals who are going to be convicted. These criminals are offered anything, and they will make any statement, so that is not serious.

Since we have talks, the Americans could have perfectly well and discreetly told us: Listen, this was not a charge in any court, this is no propaganda: We have proof that two Cuban officers are involved in these operations, and this is how they are doing it. The truth is that they could have tested us had they acted this way. I do not think they would have burned any agent. Perhaps they will claim we were going to ask how they knew. Well, they did not have to burn any agent. All they had to say was: We have reliable reports that these two people are involved in this and are carrying out their operations this way. This would have been discovered a long time ago. I do not know how long they had the names of those involved. However, they had Ruiz Poo's name very early in the game. They had known for a long time that the planes carrying drugs were landing in Varadero and that the drugs would then be shipped by boat.

We are not trying to blame the United States now. That is not our intention. However, I can cite an example that occurred not long ago. Through intelligence information, Cuba got word that a group of reactionaries in a U.S. state—I do not recall the exact details right now—were considering an attempt on Reagan's life. They were considering an attempt on Reagan's life, and we got the information. However, the information we had was not too clear. To make it clearer, we would have had to conduct an investigation in the United States. However, not 48 hours had passed, not even 24 hours had passed, when I had already ordered the Interior Ministry to report to U.S. authorities that there were certain people in a southern state who were considering an attempt on Reagan's life during an upcoming visit he had planned to that state. We reported this to them immediately. We did not waste a minute investigating or confirming this. We did not care that Reagan was a sworn enemy of our revolution and that he had a very aggressive policy against Cuba. We believed that it was a basic duty to report such a serious matter.

I think the only two times we made a kind gesture toward Reagan was when he was wounded, and we expressed our concern and rejection over what happened to the U.S. Government, and on this occasion, when we learned that people were plotting against the U.S. President's life. We did not hesitate. We did not disclose this. We are mentioning this now. This must have happened 2 or 3 years ago. It is being mentioned now because we have no other choice than to recall this precedent.

In the same way that we conveyed that information to them, they could have conveyed the information that they had available on this drug trafficking in a confidential manner, as we did with them. That is what really hurts us. In spite of everything and all the secrecy, we began to investigate this drug trafficking. What prompted the investigation? It was prompted by this campaign, by rumors that reached us through our friends and through what was mentioned in these drug-trafficking circles that there were Cuban officials cooperating with them. In fact, they even said that some Cuban officials had stolen certain amounts of drugs, certain shipments, from the drug traffickers.

On the one hand, we saw the campaigns by the United States. On the other hand, we heard rumors on what drug-trafficking leaders had said, rumors that reached us by diverse means, without mentioning names, of course.

To this situation is added a 6 March 1989 cable. What did the cable say? It said: Two drug traffickers declared themselves guilty of transporting over 1 ton of cocaine through Cuba, with the alleged assistance of officials and military men of that country, the Miami office of the Federal District Attorney reported today.

Reinaldo and Ruben Ruiz admitted their guilt on the 17 counts presented against them and they could face a life sentence, a spokesperson for the District Attorney's Office stated.

The two men who were indicted in February 1988 transported the cocaine in an aircraft from Colombia, which made stopovers in Panama, Cuba, and Haiti, the charges read. The band was infiltrated by secret agents who posed as buyers and who made audio and video recordings of their meetings with the drug leaders, the District Attorney's Office explained.

In dozens of recorded hours of meetings that the court admitted as firm evidence, Reinaldo and Ruben Ruiz declared they had broad, high-level contacts in Cuba and boasted of smoking Cuban cigars that, according to them, were from Fidel's drawer.

The dossier gives details of the cases in which Ruben Ruiz had flown from Cuba to Colombia...[corrects himself] had flown from Colombia to the military airport in Varadero, Cuba, carrying 1,000 pounds, 500 kg, on each flight. On the next occasion, in April 1987, the drug was unloaded by military personnel, taken to a dock, and loaded on a ship named "Florida," which was escorted by Cuban coastguard vessels until it left Cuban territorial waters, the dossier read.

Of course, when I saw this, especially the part about the drawer, I had the slight impression it was another lie—especially, gentlemen, because I have not smoked for 4 years. Therefore, there cannot be any cigars in my

drawer. I no longer smoked by 1987. The way the report was phrased, it appeared to be what I was talking about earlier: A prisoner who is condemned is lost and will say what they want him to say.

In any event, this was a little bit like what happened to me when I realized Eutimio Guerra was betraying us in the Sierra Maestra. What they said, the rumors that reached us, the news concerning what mafia leaders had said, and the previous campaigns with all these details appeared a little strange. Then I spoke to Interior Minister Comrade Abrantes and told him an investigation had to be carried out.

I confess I was far from imagining there could be an entire gang inside the ministry doing this. But I said there is someone involved in this; someone is doing something; there is even someone who actually might be swindling these drug traffickers. I reached the conclusion that this had to be investigated; it could not be dismissed as a simple rumor, as mere slander; it had to be investigated. This happened in mid-March. It must have been a few days after this cable arrived.

This does not mean press agency reports are serious ones, as a rule. Sometimes—this was an exception—they tell the truth.

I was just reading a UPI report that states that a small aircraft was being chased by Coast Guards and that it entered Cuban territory, that MiG planes had taken off to prevent the Coast Guard planes from entering our waters. This is what a wire report said. That is a big lie, and the Americans themselves should know the truth, because they were told about this. Three small aircraft almost crashed. Their flights are not very easy, because they fly by night with their lights switched off and at low altitudes.

However, the truth is that 2 nights ago, a small plane was being chased by Coast Guard planes that entered our national territory. Two MiG-23 aircraft immediately took off to intercept the small plane and to chase it; it was flying from north to south. Two more planes took off because the first two had run out of fuel; it was nighttime and the planes were even given the order to open fire on the small airplane. Three orders had been given to open fire on small aircrafts that were taking very irregular flight paths.

That is what happened. The planes took off and chased the small aircraft. Then two more planes took off and the small aircraft flew across and got away. I do not know at what altitude it was flying; it was approximately 2200 [not further identified]. The Border Guards were instructed to report what had happened at that hour of the night. Now look at how evil these people are. Just look at how evil they are and how they wage their campaign: The wire report says that the planes took off to intercept the Coast Guard planes and that the small aircraft flew into our national territory because it felt protected while flying over Cuba.

These are things we must discuss with the Americans, and we have exchanged some notes on this. Actually, we have exchanged more than notes; there are reports and something has been said. We must have discussions to see how we will handle this kind of situation. We were serious when we said what we did about the planes violating our airspace. That statement was very serious. Of course, we want to take all measures because we do not want any innocent person or the wrong person to suffer the consequences. This requires very precise pilot training to prevent any such accidents from taking place.

Therefore, this will have to be regulated in some way. Some means of communications between the United States [and Cuba] will have to be found in this common battle. We say common, because actually many times—the Americans know this, and I have explained this in some interviews—these planes were overflying [our territory] and were ordered to land; and they scoffed at the order to land. They were not shot at, but the decision on whether to shoot into the air at one of those planes that was not obeying was a very difficult decision. The pilot might be a drug trafficker, a journalist, a U.S. senator—lost somewhere over there—or a private citizen who, when ordered to land, does not want to land in this hell the U.S. propaganda has portrayed.

In other words, we have always thought about this, but we have told them on more than one occasion: We cannot tolerate this situation, which now, of course, it is completely intolerable. We cannot allow our airspace to be mocked. For many years, the United States has been mocking our airspace. While the drug traffickers mocked our airspace to do their business, the United States sent their planes to spy on Cuba and to violate our airspace. So there have been two violations—one by the drug traffickers and the other by the United States. It has been a long time since airspace violations have occurred involving the use of this special U.S. plane. However, violations by groups of drug traffickers are frequent. Often, these are not technical violations because they fly along the flight paths and fulfill all requirements. It is very difficult to search a small aircraft using a flight path to determine its cargo. However, when planes stray from the flight path or deviate from the required altitudes, it is possible to detect any irregularity, and of course, that must end.

Are we anxious to fire at those planes? No, we are not anxious to do so. Our pilots have been very cautious. However, if we want the country's sovereignty to be respected, if we do not want them to mock our laws, we will have no other alternative but to fire at aircraft that violate our airspace in strange and very irregular ways. Of course, we would take measures to ensure that under no circumstances will a plane which is obviously carrying civilians be involved in an accident of this kind.

I have already commented on how propaganda works in the United States. They were already accusing us or trying to suggest that we had offered protection and that our fighter planes had been deployed to keep U.S. Coast Guard planes away. This has created a very irregular situation that must be regulated in one way or another.

I said this reminds me of when we discovered a traitor. I said: We must investigate this and, sure enough, an investigation was begun in mid-March. I have an important report here.

They gave the first task to radio—how do they call it?—radio counterintelligence to monitor all communications from Miami and Colombia and to monitor planes and ships. What did counterintelligence discover? It is contained in this report.

It states: Beginning on 16 March 1989, radio direction-findings [ubicaciones radiogoniometricas] indicated that the callsign The Fat One [gordo], which is frequently used by a network out of Miami and by vessels, was detected northwest of Havana, near the coast; therefore, that became the target of priority attention.

On 27 March, during his radio conversations with Miami, The Fat One said he could not carry out any activities until after the 5th [month not given]. On 27 March 1989, The Fat One changed his call sign to 13. I am only reading the paragraphs that give you an idea of what was going on.

The reports says: The first results indicated that the O was in Havana—O means objective. It says the O was in Havana, northwest of El Morro [an area in Havana]. The Intelligence Department discovered someone was transmitting from that area.

After that discovery, there was a change in the behavior of the objective. At that time, call signs 35 and 20 came into the picture. There were constant changes in frequencies, and the radio transmissions were very brief, thus making our investigations more difficult. Despite that, we succeeded in determining the transmissions originated in various points in the western end of Havana, especifically within the area between the Almendares River and Barlovento. Barlovento is the area between 5th and 7th Streets and 62 - 66 Miramar...[corrects himself] the area from 5th to 7th Streets—these are two areas—to 210 Miramar, the Triton Hotel. [sentence as heard]

The report continues: During that period, we noticed an increase in their methods to disguise their transmissions. On 23 April 1989, call signs R-1 northern Matanzas Province and R-2 in Florida State established radio contact. During their conversations, they hinted that an operation would take place in which drugs would be dropped from a plane. We decided to send our units to Hicacos Peninsula.

The report adds: The drug operation began at 2200 on 23 April 1989. The drugs were dropped from a plane named Tocayo. According to the radio conversations, the plane dropped 25 packages in an area near Key Cruz del Padre. The drop took place at about 0500. One of our units located R-1 no farther than 20 km northeast of Punta Hicacos. At 1245 on 24 April 1989, another drug operation began in the same area. This time, the operation was coordinated by callsign 130 in Florida State, call sign 57 on board the plane, and call sign 125 between Varadero Beach and Key Cruz del Padre.

The radio counterintelligence reached the following conclusion in their report: In light of the information obtained through the radio transmissions and the radio direction-findings, it is clear the activities carried out by The Fat One and the other call signs are linked to drug trafficking. In addition, the radio transmissions reveal that the drops take place in Cuban territory and jurisdictional waters.

This is the conclusion reached by counterintelligence in a report sent to the ministry on 25 April, to which we must add two reports from 24 April describing each of these events. Moreover, through radio counterintelligence and by intercepting communications, they were able to have an idea of what was going on. A meeting was held on 27 March...[corrects himself] April, at the MININT high command—with all this information in hand—to investigate what was going on. In other words, to proceed to seize some of the boats. However, what happened? Tony de la Guardia attended this 27 April meeting. His group was already aware of radio-counterintelligence operations in Varadero and the 27 April meeting, which gave instructions to various directorates on this matter. Tony de la Guardia attended this meeting. He was asked some questions regarding the radio, about the messages being sent. Of course, he responded negatively to the questions.

The radio-counterintelligence operation was working so accurately that the radio was located precisely in the zone mentioned in the report. The radio was located precisely in this area, although they moved around and sometimes went out in a boat off the coast. They they did not remain in a fixed point, but Amado Padron's offices were located precisely in this zone. Therefore, an investigation was under way, and the culprits immediately realized the investigation was being conducted, so they suspended all operations. They suspended all operations. My question is: Would we have discovered through this investigation what was happening and who was involved if the Ochoa problem had not happened? The fact of the matter is May passed calmly, June was passing by, and no results had been obtained from the investigation we had ordered. We discovered [Fidel pounds on the table] the problem of Tony de la Guardia's activities precisely while we were conducting an investigation on Ochoa's activities. We were far from supposing these two activities could be linked.

We acted very carefully regarding Ochoa, with all the necessary cautiousness, starting from reports on moral matters, linking them to other reports that had been received at various times. We added all that and were clearly able to see that various irregular activities were going on. We had already decided to appoint him chief of the Western Army after he had returned from Angola.

These reports and analyses led to the postponement of Ochoa's designation to the post. He could not be designated unless some of these issues were cleared up and explained. We had to be very careful. When MINFAR informed me of these activities, particularly the moral ones, they were indicative of such deterioration that they precluded Ochoa's designation as chief of the Western Army.

Nevertheless, there was still hope that an in-depth discussion could be held with Ochoa with a view to correcting the irregularities. At the time, I considered all of his achievements, his rank, and his position as a hero of the Republic of Cuba. I thought of the speculation that would be unleashed worldwide, the scandal that would ensue if, because of these problems, Ochoa had to be stripped of his medals, degraded, fired, expelled from the Armed Forces, or incarcerated.

At that time, there was nothing as serious as what was learned later. Investigations had to be carried out very carefully, because some people had to be interrogated. How could we interrogate some of his collaborators, some of those who worked with him, like Martinez, the others? It could become evident an investigation was being carried out. If any of those moral issues were serious, anything could happen, because when there is moral deterioration, all ethics are lost, and when all ethics are lost, one cannot trust anyone, because all principles have been lost. A revolutionary is a revolutionary by virtue of principles, by virtue of ethics.

We were not going to arrest Ochoa just so he would not escape and then conduct an investigation. That cannot be done, and it is generally not done with anyone. We must admit that counterintelligence worked very hard and very carefully to obtain information without Ochoa suspecting that he was being investigated. That type of investigation normally requires authorization, as he was a member of the Central Committee. In other words, in our country there are principles and norms that are complied with in dealing with people. One cannot humiliate a person and imprison him because there are rumors about him. That is not and cannnot be the style of the revolution.

However, that became a headache for us, because of the precedent set by people who were corrupt and later fled, and became heroes of the other side; then they became parrots and repeated everything the imperialists put in their mouths. That was the main problem we had that week and to which Comrade Raul has referred.

We continued to gather information, then we decided to have the first conversation—which I believe was on 29 May [year not specified]—with him. Raul had a very serious 3-hour conversation with him. Raul had notes with him, he had everything, and he talked about a number of things that had been confirmed up to that moment and other things that had not been confirmed. He was warned, he was told why he was not going to be appointed. We waited for him to react, to cooperate, to show concern, to tell the truth. Actually, he was very evasive in that conversation.

A few days went by, and we knew he felt very depressed over the conversation, that he was ashamed. Then he reacted, and there is a second conversation. That was on 2 June. I thought that inasmuch as he had requested a private meeting with the minister, he was going to speak and be frank. The previous meeting was with three comrades: Raul, Furry, and Ulises. He wanted a private meeting, and we thought he was probably ashamed to speak, but he was going to speak out.

While this was going on—and although we had evidence—it was decided not to speak about those serious moral charges, because two things could happen when you speak to a man about that. He might shoot himself, and we thought that would be so unfortunate that we decided not to include the topic in his conversation with Raul. So we decided to set that aside, and we were going to speak about everything else. Why? It is almost impossible to make an arrangement with an individual when you tell him: Look, we know this. We decided to cope with that problem only in an indirect manner, with an attitude of rectifying what he was doing.

I must admit that at that moment—although we were aware of a number of irregularities—we were unaware of others. For example: The money in Panama, the account, nothing of that was known at that time. Elements of judgment are gathered in a very careful and shrewd manner. We were always wondering what to do with him: Leave him in the Armed Forces? What task could be assigned to him? What would his reaction be? At the time of the first meeting, we were still considering leaving him in the Armed Forces, giving him treatment [as heard], giving him an opportunity.

I remember that on the eve of the second meeting, I told Raul—a group of comrades used to meet to analyze the problem; very few problems have been so carefully analyzed—ask him if he has any accounts abroad. Judging from all the other elements, I started to think that he must have an account abroad. Raul asked him: Do you have any? Ah, yes, but a very small amount. But how much do you have? Just a little something [una boberia], he said. That was the answer he gave. I cannot even remember, he said, a little something. All of this happened between the 29th and the 2d, between 29 May and 2 June.

We got together on 11 June. No, the 10th was a Saturday. We got together on Friday. On Friday I knew that the comrades from the MINFAR, the MINFAR's High Command, who were studying this situation had reached the conclusion that Ochoa's activities were grave and that there was no other alternative but to arrest him.

We asked Polo to return from Angola. We wanted him to give us some information about all this. We wanted to know whether he knew anything about it. That same day, 11 June, was the day of the 14 hours—I am not sure if it was 14 hours . We met for 14 hours. 11 June was a very important day. On that day, we examined some of the operations in which Comrade Diocles Torralba was involved. Torralba was closely linked—not with those operations we were examining—but closely linked to other activities, especially through the De la Guardia brothers.

While investigating those operations, we came across some of the activities in which Mr Diocles Torralba was involved. The people we questioned said various things, such as: This and that was done; they often said vague things. During the search at Hidalberto's [not further identified] house, we discovered Diocles was living there and discovered some of the activities in which he was involved.

On 11 June, we examined a series of documents proving Torralba's involvement in some of those activities. Those documents were irrefutable and unquestionable evidence of the immoralities in which Ochoa and one of the De la Guardia brothers were involved.

We found out that one girl who had attended one of the parties was disguised as an internationalist combatant, as a MININT member. We found out they sent her to Luanda, where she stayed almost 1 month before returning to Cuba. This happened in September 1988. In February 1989, the girl began talking about certain things. That was one of the clues leading to our discovery of important activities.

The decisive day, however, was 11 June. On that day, I met with some comrades of the MINFAR at my office. They had already decided what had to be done. I requested more facts to formulate an opinion. We learned important facts from our conversation with Polo. We were unaware of those facts. On that same day, we received several intelligence reports about deals involving money. On that same day, we received information about the bank account in Panama.

I then asked each comrade to give me their opinion, as we did here today. Each of the chiefs gave their opinions and views. They said that regardless of the consequences, we had to do something then. I agreed with them, and we unanimously decided to arrest Ochoa immediately. We had been watching him closely 24 hours a day, but that was very difficult. Sometimes he disappeared for 2 hours around the area of Santa Fe. We thought perhaps he could get on a boat or something, because nobody knew what he could do. The activities in which Ochoa was involved were already very serious. It was necessary to arrest him. There was no possible justification.

It was absolutely necessary to arrest him and try him for his involvement in those activities. We knew the situation was not easy. We know what happens when such a high-ranking official is arrested. We knew the kind of campaign this action would spark. However, we decided to face all those things.

What we could not imagine is what we later discovered. Our subsequent discoveries surprised everybody. The new discoveries began with a letter, which did not specifically address the topic, but did hint toward Jorge Martinez' involvement in drug trafficking. That letter discussed a book on the mafia. There was also a very small card related to a hotel in Colombia, in Medellin. That is how we began investigating the drug link.

We arrested Patricio and Tony de la Guardia for the operations carried out in Angola and for their link with Ochoa. We arrested the De la Guardia's for their participation in ivory and diamond smuggling. That is why we arrested them. We realized they were not only involved in hosting big parties or things like that but also in illegal activities such as smuggling. That is why we arrested the two of them. We arrested each of the De la Guardia brothers at the same time but in different ways. We arrested one brother at a certain hour and the other brother at another hour. We adopted all the necessary measures so none of them would take off.

We proceeded to arrest them, and the investigation began. This occurred on...[unidentified speaker prompts him: "12 June"] On 12 June, we arrested them, and on the following night, we already had the main information about the drug case. This is what I can report about these events; I have provided it so you can have a broader perspective—not only you but, if we are going to broadcast this event, all the people—of the case.

Now, we have to get to conclusions. We have to broach the subject for which we are meeting. All I have said about the subject up to now has been to provide more facts on which to make a judgement. It is true our decision is important; it is true our decision has to do with human lives and is a decision that cannot be taken rashly. I do not believe any one of us will take it rashly. We are all very conscious of the importance of this decision, because it is a function attributed to the State Council in the Constitution.

The perspectives that lie ahead of us have to be taken into account, which I believe has already been stated here. We have to be aware of the impact the decision made here will have on our future.

Did Ochoa have a chance to save himself? I mention Ochoa because he is the most important person in this case. Did Ochoa have a chance to save himself? Yes, Ochoa really had the opportunity to save himself. I have given this a great deal of thought. He was given many opportunities, at least several opportunitites. Ochoa could have saved himself in the first conversation he held with Raul if he had been frank, open, sincere, responsible, and truthful.

Just imagine if on 29 May, Ochoa had told Raul everything—what he did, the activities, the money, the account there, what these individuals were doing. This would have been so important and worth taking into account! Of course, Ochoa could not have remained in the Armed Forces, but had he rendered this service, we could have even discussed whether to take him to court or not. Just imagine! We could have discussed it. If this man had come and opened his heart, told everything, and rendered the country the service of saying this gang existed, he could have spared us the surprise. This could have been discussed if the man had been truly repentant. It would not have come to the point of discussing whether or not to execute him. That was one opportunity.

I have asked myself many times: Had he done this, what could have been an appropriate action to take regarding a man who did something like that? We would have had to take this very much into account. It would have been possible to release him from prison, to recover the money, to learn everything. There was a real opportunity at that moment. We would have had to take his attitude into account.

He had another opportunity the second time he talked with Raul. He himself said he came close to confessing everything but did not dare or did not have the moral fortitude to confess, and he did not. This was a second opportunity.

He had a third opportunity on the day he was arrested. He could have said: Let me talk; I will explain everything. He could have done so a few hours after his arrest, or the next morning. He could have said: I am going to cooperate; I am going to explain everything I have done, all of the terrible things I have done. If he had confessed before anybody, if we had not had to discover what they had done, we could have had the option of sparing his life and giving him the harshest possible sentence save for capital punishment.

He did not have this attitude. He did not cooperate in any way. We had to inquire, investigate, and work hard to discover everything without Ochoa's cooperation.

All of this was discovered. His involvement in drugs and his complicity with this de la Guardia gang was discovered. All the operations they had been carrying out were discovered. And all, or almost all—I think we learned the major part—of the facts were discovered. However, I believe that by then it was certainly too late to have avoided the most severe penalty.

We were all impressed at the honor court. This does not mean we have changed our viewpoints. However, we believe he was honest and courageous. We were even satisfied he had acted in that manner. Although I felt a point of no return had been reached, it could serve to leave something to the closest relatives. It could serve to leave some sort of positive image amid that drama, amid that painful incident. But at that point, in those circumstances, and at that moment, we had no alternative. We faced a situation with no alternative. However, at least we saw his testimony was positive, that it contained a vestige of the qualities that had earned him the honors of a hero, why he received his stripes, why he became a member of the party's Central Committee, why he was a division general of our Armed Forces. I think that day he was sincere. I think that day he sincerely repented. I think he was, of course, courageous. Our people admire courage.

Above all, our people appreciated the contrast between the attitude assumed by Ochoa at the honor court and the attitude of the others, the ones who had organized the mafia inside MININT. They appreciated it. Our people suffered. We all suffered a lot with the testimonies of other MINFAR officers. I particularly was indignant, irritated, hurt to see how those men had destroyed their careers—men who had studied in the academies and received their ranks for their service. I told myself: If they had had other superiors, these men would not have been corrupted as they were. This is not an excuse for whoever commits a certain wrongdoing, but at least it helps to explain and perhaps even mitigate it.

But it hurt us to see that situation. The honor tribunal had 2 days, 1 of them very sad, this was the day when many people testified, and 1 day of glory. This latter day was when the members of the honor tribunal spoke with great eloquence and force, as well as with great pain, but firmness. However, Comrade Ochoa's attitude, as was said here by Comrade Carlos I believe, influenced the honor tribunal's opinion. Of course, that could complicate the solution to the problem, not change it. It could produce a contradiction between what the tribunal did, what the Council of State said, and the people's opinion.

I have already mentioned the firm opinion that this matter could not be decided by public inquiry nor anything like that. Thus, the difficulties a determined situation can have, is something that must be analyzed from another angle, politically. Ochoa was sincere in front of the honor tribunal, but he was not sincere with the judicial tribunal, he was not. He was different. He was another man. He was empty. He did not want to assume the responsibility, he lied. He said he ignored Tony de la Guardia's activities. Tony de la Guardia and Ochoa spoke frequently in Angola. In 1988 Tony de la Guardia made six trips to Angola and on all of the trips

he spoke with Ochoa about this matter. Martinez was a frequent contact for this group, and Ochoa denied that he knew about Tony de la Guardia's activities.

He said that he was leaving that, he said he was looking for a foreign friend to give him all the contacts and forget about this. He said that since he just wanted to help the country, all he wanted was his friend to carry out the big operations and then invest the money as if it were capital from a foreigner, a foreigner's property to be invested in tourism; as if the country needed that type of money. What the nation needs is arms to build all it can build with the capital offered, capital that has nothing to do with drug trafficking.

Martinez' argument, as much as Ochoa's, was that they had the account in the name of the friend and later changed it because the friend could die. If you consider that a foreign friend can die, that a foreign friend can die [repeats himself], and you have to take measures with an account that has $200,000, I ask myself: Why can the friend not die if the account had $500 million, $1 billion, $20 million, or $50 million? Here we have been talking about the foreign friend and we have not mentioned him. We know that the foreign friend... [changes thought] We have the opinion... [changes thought] We have tried not to involve people who we believe were tricked into these activities. It was not the foreign friend who led Ochoa to these activities, it was Ochoa who insisted to the foreign friend that these activities had to be carried out. This is why we have been careful with some names and why they have not been released to the press. There is no other reason for this.

Anyway, there are strange statements saying they did not want anything more to do with that. It has been proven that during the first 3 months of 1989, Martinez travelled to Panama to make contact with his associates, with his friends, to carry out drug trafficking plans. Something else, until April of this month, Ochoa had been insisting on a big operation, or big operations, of a ship with 10 tons of drugs. He wanted the ship to stop on the north part of the island and then load the drugs onto launches. Actually, he did not have the same seriousness, the same honesty, during the oral hearing.

I believe a series of serious arguments have been discussed here. They have been serious and solid arguments to explain why we do not have an alternative in this case. Who would be able to believe in the revolution? Who would be able to believe in the seriousness of the revolution if, for such serious faults, the most severe penalties established by the nation's laws are not applied? As has already been stated, all of these events have the elements of treason. What is treason? Treason is to sell your country, and they sold the country. Treason is to put the nation in jeopardy, and they placed the nation in serious jeopardy. Treason is to undermine the nation's morals and the revolution's prestige. They have been doing things that undermine the revolution's morals and prestige. They weaken it in every sense.

Here, the revolution and the laws dictate capital punishment for spies. A CIA agent can be shot. I ask myself: Could a CIA agent cause the damage that these gentlemen were causing? A CIA agent can get information on the economy, something military, or something. I ask myself: Could 10 CIA agents cause the damage these people were causing? Could 50 CIA agents cause this damage? Could they expose the country the way these people were exposing the nation? CIA agents are judged and shot. If an exemplary punishment is not imposed in this case...[changes thought] Someone said: Who else could deserve this punishment?

I ask myself: How can we guarantee discipline in our armed forces and in the Ministry of the Interior if the chief of an army, the chief of tens of thousands of men in battle, in war, takes the luxury of devoting a single second of the time dedicated to his duties to these activities? What can we demand from a military chief? What can we expect from future heroes and future chiefs? What can we expect from bosses, men who put themselves above the law and morals? What can we expect from men who put themselves above the nation? I think that one of the things that gives us the most pride is our officers' and military chiefs' modesty; the honesty of our officers and military chiefs. We are proud of their conduct, of which we had proof during the honor tribunal. What could we say to the future chiefs, the future heroes if an action of such great severity is not punished with the most severe penalty our laws establish?

Our army is characterized by its discipline, by its unconditional loyalty to the revolution, to the principles of the revolution, and to the Communist Party of Cuba [PCC]. This is one of the things that most satisfies us about our army and our chiefs. We can say that with his insolence, Ochoa put himself above the laws because he was a hero, a general, and a member of the PCC Central Committee. It would be an ill-fated and demoralizing precedent if we do not apply the most severe penalties. For others like Martinez, who consciously did what he did, we would not be showing that there are actions that cannot be approved, such as doing these things under the pretext of carrying out orders. If we do not punish the two main people from the Ministry of the Interior, how could we rebuild the Ministry of the Interior? How could we regain that institution's prestige, a prestige which has been seriously damaged by these events. How could we someday hope to have discipline in an institution which is so fundamental for the nation, a nation in revolution, for a nation that is 90 miles away from the United States? How could we have discipline in that institution? How could we speak of rectification? Who would speak of rectification again if the most incredible joke played on the principles of the process of rectification are not punished? Like someone here said, when we were in the middle of that battle, the battle of rectification, the most atrocious things are done. They laughed, they made fun of the principles. Remember what was said on 19 April 1986? Then all of this happens from 1987 to 1989. What future could the process of rectification have if a simple

prison sentence is issued? Would it be enough to constitute an example? Would it be enough to save and preserve the values we are protecting?

In every sense, we must examine the great damage suffered by the nation. We have to examine the political damage. We have to review many cables and declarations. We have to see how they impute the whole government without excluding anyone. We have to examine more than just what they placed in danger, the revolution's prestige and credibility. However, this has already been stated. We are going to recuperate the prestige and credibility and it will be stronger than before. We are going to recuperate it and make it stronger, not by virtue of the actions committed by those sanctioned, we are going to recuperate and make it stronger despite their actions. This is based on how the nation gave face to what they did.

Many people in the world are astonished. Some people say we have given this too much importance. The problem is that in many parts of the world this does not have much importance. Embezzling, robbery, indiscipline, impunity, and dirty dealings do not have any importance in some places. However, to us it has great importance and we have given it the importance it deserves. Of course, as has been said, we will turn this setback into a victory. This will depend on the attitude the nation takes, as well as on the measures taken. It will not just depend on the sanctions, it will also depend on what happens after the sanctions. Here I am referring to all of those who may be potential followers of this conduct.

No, I do not believe that the process of rectification is going to lose, it is going to win. As Raul said; he said a peasant said that the rectification process can now advance 10 years. I think rectification will now be understood more. The PCC is now going to have more force to demand and impose rules. It will also have more force to sweep away with everything that smells rotten. So then, basing ourselves on the revolution's credibility and prestige, I think that the punishment should be exemplary and the sanctions should be the most severe.

Among the damages done, they were weakening our defenses considerably. They were morally disarming us, as we have already said. They were handing the enemy on a silver platter the opportunity to gather proof to discredit Cuba. What would revolutionary Cuba be like without international credibility?

What would revolutionary Cuba be like without prestige? What would revolutionary Cuba be like facing the imperialist enemy without morals? What would we be like facing that enemy that hounds us so much, that enemy that wanted to place us on the bench of the accused with regards to human rights. They were not able to get a sanction against the nation because of our morals, prestige, and Cuba's credibility. These men attacked all of this. They said they were going to help the nation collecting $2 million, which they in fact pocketed, squandered, and used to corrupt everyone. They used $2 million to corrupt many people with their genial way of helping the revolution. They themselves did not believe they were helping the revolution for a single minute.

The nation spends no less than $1 billion in defense. It spends over $1 billion on the Revolutionary Armed Forces alone. Calculate how much all the steel, wood, iron rods, and material resources we invest to prepare the operations sector and defense sector are worth. They are worth over $1 billion. The nation spends 500 times more than what these miserable people were collecting. The nation spends this amount of money with great sacrifice, and these people, for $2 million, were weakening the nation's defenses, selling the nation. I have not included in this figure the hundreds of millions the nation spends on the Ministry of the Interior. This money is used for internal order, as well as for state security. The nation spends hundreds of millions on security and these miserable people were corrupting and scorning us with a few miserable dollars. The damage they have done to the national economy... [changes thought] Who knows how much damage they have done to the national economy. The prosecutor spoke about this in his concluding statements. Varadero, what reputation would Varadero have in the world as a result of this mafia's activities?

The nation which has some of the best possibilities with regards to tourism, the nation that has the most immediate possibility to obtain the needed resources, especially in convertible currency, has tourist possibilities that could yield $500 million, $800 million, $1 billion every year, and this mafia, with their filth in drugs, was placing the country in danger. They were throwing everything to the ground. One of the things tourism likes is the security and tranquility they can find in our fatherland. What damage have they done to legitimate activities, legitimate and clean commerce carried out by the nation? They have made a mess, they have compromised things. They have involved activities that have nothing to do with them, activities that are legitimate and clean. Someday, we will have to see the level of damage done to the nation's legitimate activities. We will have to see the damage done to honest activities of a commercial nature. There are activities that are morally unobjectionable. How much damage have they caused our enterprises abroad?

They have caused terrible damage to the Ministry of the Interior. You could almost say that they have morally destroyed the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior must be reconstructed. It has to be rebuilt. Let us say that the accused alone are not responsible, this is the truth. Let us say that the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior has some culpability, and this has to be said now, because of its insensibility with regards to the conduct of these men whom everyone knew were potentates. Everyone knew they spent and flaunted money and that they lived differently than everyone else. It is

incredible! In the trial, it was stated that one of the men had 10 cars. That man, Amado Padron, almost certainly had been mentioned to everyone here: He was mentioned here; they talked about him there. They probably heard the same thing of the de la Guardia brothers. People heard about their lives and their conduct. The ministry was insensitive, despite the efforts we have made in the ministry, despite the efforts we have made [repeats himself] and despite the guidelines the ministry has, it was insensitive.

The ministry, among other things, was told—and it was stated in the report to the Third Congress—that they had to be unblemished because they are the ones who have to demand respect for the law and adequate conduct from the others, from the ones who have to clash in the streets with others. It was proposed that there not be clinics for the combatants of the Ministry of the Interior because this would separate them from the people. They were to go to the clinics the people go to. There were already Ministry of the Interior clinics in Pinar del Rio and other provinces, we said to return them. It was proposed that they not have restaurants nor recreation areas. In some places, these installations were already being built. We said: Return them, turn them over to the people. There was also military commerce. We listened to the complaints and said: Cease military commerce. One of the serious problems in the Ministry of the Interior was that they tried to equate themselves with the armed forces. The armed forces have different tasks, different missions, and different functions. Do not believe that the measures adopted were little things.

These measures were taken to make certain that the Ministry of the Interior did not separate itself from the people. The times I spoke about this were not few. If I heard about a party that cost several thousands, what were we to do with the responsible person? I said: No, I do not want a scapegoat. What I want is for this never to be repeated again. Unfortunately, it was not to be like so. This gang corrupted people; they made many gifts, and not just trashy gifts, to use the expression the people use. They have been doing it for some time. Why was Tony de la Guardia and the entire group of the CIMEX [State Enterprise for Import Export] Corporation removed? Because they had established a style. They imported all the imitation jewelry they could find. They imported white-walled tires, crystal of a certain type, little telephones, tape recorders, video cassette records in the cars, all kinds of things. They were removed from there.

Those people should never have been in the MC with the prerogatives they had at that point, much less organize multinationals under the pretext of breaking the blockade. That was prohibited. [pounds podium 3 times] That was conducted by not following precise and concrete instructions that were given to the ministry. All kinds of resources appeared in the hands of a small group of discredited people. Not only did they give away costume jewelry, color television sets, video cassette recorders, but they even gave away yachts that were valued at tens of thousands of dollars. They stole those yachts or lost them with the boatmen as their accomplices. The owners were delighted to collect from their insurance. The yachts were sold and resold here, or given away as gifts. Who knows how many people received gifts from this gang.

They created a system of relationships, of friendships that corrupted and, in my opinion, created a neutralizing effect which has caused terrible damage to the Ministry of the Interior. The ministry has such large functions to carry out. There is now a climate of bitterness. This is not the moment to forget the extraordinary services that the men and women of the ministry gave to the revolution during these 30 years; these are services that the country has needed, needs, and continues to need until who knows when. It is not a time to forget the heroism, courage, and the sacrifice made by so many men of the Ministry of the Interior. They rendered so many services to the country, especially the men of the state security organs, not to mention the services of the firemen, or the services the national police have given to the country. Like it was said during the oral trial: How difficult is it going to be, and how much time will it take to rebuild the trust and the abilities of some of the organs of the Ministry of the Interior? However, we will rebuild them, I do not have the slightest doubt about that.

There are some who have compared the FAR to the Ministry of the Interior, and I say that is very unjust. We must reiterate it whenever necessary. There is no possible comparison between the role of one institution and the role of another, although they are both important. The Ministry of the Interior was created from the rebel army. The Ministry of the Interior was created from the FAR. The Ministry of the Interior is the son of the rebel army, and, first of all, we must put each institution in its place. Especially now, the FAR has to again help the Ministry of the Interior. I say that the comparison is unjust, because I am saying this with my heart in my hand. If there is an institution that has been demanding in this country, if there is an institution that has had standards, if there has been an institution that has been, par excellence, an educating institution in this country, it has been the FAR. If there is a comrade who has been a struggler and demanding, that comrade is Raul. [pounds on podium three times] That is why we must indignantly deny the suggestion that comes from the enemy [which is] that if there was change in the Ministry of the Interior, there must also have been change in the FAR. That is an intrigue of the enemy. If we have discovered this cancer, it is precisely because of the FAR. [pounds on podium three times] If today we have many cadres with which to help the Ministry of the Interior, it is because of the cadres we have in the FAR.

Our FAR is comprised of two essential, fundamental institutions that are basic to our revolution and that have different problems, of a different nature. There was

really no Mafia in the Armed Forces. Two different groups were involved in these activities. When it came time to say things, they had to be said clearly.

How much time have all of us had to dedicate these past few days to this problem? How much time has Raul had to spend on this? How much time have I had to spend on this problem. What was I doing? What did I devote myself to? I made an enormous effort in all areas through the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers.

I had begun to develop plans for transportation in the capital, which was then at about 25,000 trips a day and is now at 30,000 trips a day. I didn't even want to hear about it. I didn't want to hear about the result of the work done on transportation in the capital until it was already super-consolidated. There was no need to talk. What we needed to do was to get it done. We were committed to programs for constructing bus terminals, central markets [mercados concentradores]. We were committed to raising the productive and constructive ability of the Construction Ministry. We were committed to radically change and sweep away bad habits, negative habits that were created in that institution. We had committed ourselves to the recovery of water resource management and to promote the construction of dozens of dams. We were committed to fulfilling plans for the drainage of sugarcane plots, engineering systems for the rice industry, construction programs for cattle processing centers, construction programs for pig and poultry processing centers. We all dedicated ourselves to increasing the production of food in our country, to resolve very important problems in every area, to inaugurate hospitals, child care centers, polyclinics, to carry out a vast number of programs in all areas of construction and agriculture. We committed ourselves to organizing contingents that now have the productivity that no other construction group has in any other country. They work longer hours than workers do in any other country to confront our underdevelopment and problems during the most difficult times, at a time when we have had less resources in convertible currency.

We have even had problems in receiving supplies that were constant for almost 30 years from the socialist area. We have also begun to have difficulties [pounds table] as a result of the changes and reforms they have applied. This makes it more difficult to obtain the supplies agreed upon for each year.

Conditions have been more difficult. We have all devoted ourselves to that work. We have been taken away from all that work. We have been forced to take a month off from this work. We suspended the meeting of the executive committee, three meetings, to dedicate ourselves to this problem because we feel it is important.

I thought that this year I would be able to devote much more time and be more dedicated to all these tasks. Last year, as I said, I had to devote almost the entire period from mid-November 1987 to October 1988 to the war in Angola until we achieved peace there, when our combatants returned victorious and laden with laurels. Just when we were trying to intensify the ideological battle, when a great enthusiasm for work developed throughout the country, a great exhilaration for work, just when we all dedicated ourselves to preparing the people for the war; we had to put it all aside to dedicate ourselves to these gentlemen, these rich little boys [senoritos], who lived the sweet life.

I talked about the contingents. How embarrassing it is that there are people dedicated to that! How embarrassing that there were people living like they did while others worked 14, 15, and 16 hours daily! The workers are forming, developing our country. They are creating a true miracle in the difficult moments of socialism. As it was said here, these are moments when socialism is being questioned, and in which they want to send it to the trash heap of history. Our country and process are a model not only of honesty, seriousness, and truthfulness, but it also tries to follow its own path, its own way of building socialism, while being aware that we are 90 miles away from the empire [sentence as heard]. With more pride, trust, and certainty than ever we fly the flag of socialism. They were threatening us with a terrible stain. They were threatening to drown us in mud and discredit. But the revolution is, was, and will be a serious matter. The revolution knows how to face all these problems like it should. What does the life of the gentlemen have to do with our working class? The habits of these gentlemen and the habits of our workers are two different worlds. We cannot rest until we have one single world—and not the world of the bourgeois, and the small bourgeois, but the world of the working class, our workers, our farmers. [pounds on podium twice] These...[rephrases] Our workers do not go around thinking about shoddy goods, a few cents, and luxuries. I have not seen that in any of those men who I admire so much. They wake up at dawn and work until 2200 and 2300 in the evening.

I recall a precedent that occurred in the Sierra Maestra. We still had a column, or two columns. We had made a long trip toward the east. While being very far from La Plata area, we received news about an outbreak of bandits among people in the 26 July movement, among some combatants who were isolated. They had robbed a store and committed several crimes; and that concerned us terribly. We said: That is not possible. If this is tolerated, permitted, and continues, this could be the death of the revolution. We walked countless hours, whole days. We carried out an extraordinary march. We sent Camilo [Cienfuegos] ahead of the soldiers so he could try to arrest all those people. So, we arrested the principal culprits. How painful it was to judge them! Some of them had been our guides. They had helped us, they had brought us food. However, the distance of the troops, the poor judgement of some people there, and irresponsibility, led them to commit actions which, under those circumstances, were very serious—acts of assault, robbery. We had to judge them, and we did. We sentenced them to the highest punishment, and we

executed them! I remember that, and it still hurts me. Those humble comrades of ours, some of them had several brothers in the troops, but they continued with us in the column. Tell me whether or not that was difficult for us. I remember that man who was called "the teacher" because he used to pretend to be one. He rendered some services. We received the news that had been [word indistinct] women, and saying he was Che. He was arrested. The same tribunal judged him and executed him immediately. We were not trigger-happy people. A whole story could be told about how many people our victorious army executed throughout the war, and there were very few. I do not think that any other revolution in the world, under war, has executed fewer people in that amount of time.

What kind of crimes had been committed by those, and I dare call them comrades? The revolution was not as developed yet as it is today. It did not have it norms and everything it has now. They made a mistake which under other circumstances would not have been so serious, but under those circumstances, it was extremely serious. No other alternative remained but to apply the highest punishment. What did those combatants do in comparison to the things these gentlemen have done, in comparison to the things done by Ochoa, de la Guardia, and his group? What was the seriousness of that action in comparison to this one? Today, we find ourselves in exactly the same (?situation). Those are such serious things—and things of this nature could threaten the future of the revolution—that there is no other alternative but to apply drastic punishment, exemplary punishment.

Various international personalities have addressed us expressing their concern, asking, urging that capital punishment not be applied to the accused. Naturally, we have also received messages from the relatives; this is probably the most difficult of all. Raul, spoke about that with much sorrow—when the children, brothers, parents address us asking us to not apply the maximum punishment, asking the Council of State to commute the sentence.

It is difficult for them to understand what they are asking of all of us, not just me. Because there are many who think that I am the one who decides whether or not one thing or another is done. I am not avoiding responsibility. If I was the only one who had to decide on this, if the Council of State president had that authority, I would adopt exactly the same decision. This is not a matter of avoiding responsibility. This is a collective decision. The world does not even know that; they think that the president of the country has the prerogative of pardoning. Everyone says: Now Castro will have to decide one thing or another. That is what is said abroad. Even in our country, many people think the decision is mine.

In reality, it is logical for these relatives, beloved ones, children, and closest relatives to ask what they are asking. However, they are asking for something which is beyond our prerogatives. They are asking for something which is beyond our duties. We hear of some cases, precedents. There was a time when the revolution could have been generous, and it was generous, without causing great damage to itself. Today, we cannot be generous...[rephrases] Today the revolution cannot be generous without causing great damage to itself. The revolution, always noble and generous, will never discriminate against the children of the responsible persons. We also suffer for those children. Like Raul said, that while thinking about this, one day he caught himself crying.

In conclusion, comrades, I believe there has never been a cleaner process in history, in our country. When I say history, I am talking about any history; and when I talk about our country, I will say that there has never been a process with more participation by everyone. I have already explained how the whole process took place, and how there was not the slightest influence on the decision of the judges, tribunals, and witnesses, or the accused, or anyone else. Furthermore, although it was our responsibility to make the final decision, here in this Council of State, practically all the comrades who hold important leadership posts in the country were consulted. First of all, I asked the opinion, one by one, of the Politburo members. The answer of each one of the Politburo members—it was not a one by one meeting, but in a meeting with all of them—their answer, unanimously, was that the most severe punishment should be applied to those who were principally responsible for these actions. Afterward, I asked the opinion of the executive committee, and of the Council of Ministers, one by one. Only two of them thought that the most severe punishment should not be applied—they used various arguments. We consulted the members of the Central Committee. Of the 162 members present, 10 argued against the application of the most severe punishment. They analyzed it, and for different reasons, arguments...[does not complete sentence] Eleven of them said that they would support whatever decision the Council of State would take; and 141 of them said that the most severe punishment should be applied. I must clarify that this was not done in 1 day. It was done at different times while the process was going on. I have already explained, and we were happy, that there were different opinions. Once the oral trial was finished, and the sentence handed down by the special tribunal was published, we requested that all the delegates of the National Assembly [of the People's Government] meet, because it is our higher organization, since we are representatives of the National Assembly. Out of the 402 delegates present, which was the total sum of the number that met in each one of the provinces, one person said he was in favor of commuting the death sentence, and 401 said they were in favor of the ratification of the sentence by the Council of State. Furthermore, many said that more of the accused should have been given capital punishment. There were many who thought that. Many even complained that one 15-year sentence proposed by the prosecutor was reduced to 10 years.

I believe that the military tribunal was generous. I believe that almost all the accused could have been sentenced to capital punishment. However, I also think that the tribunal was just in its decision.

We could add that it was a wise decision. It is better that a lot of people complain that the sentences were not drastic enough, than to have them some day complain that they were too drastic. However, I think the decision was very wise. I think our tribunals have simply sent out a warning; undoubtedly, if actions of this nature would ever be repeated, the measures would be much more drastic.

It is difficult to think that some men are going to die as a result of all this, and as a result of our very own decision. Yes, it is difficult, it is bitter. This could not be pleasant for anyone. However, I also think about others who have died. I think about those who fell in order to build a decent country, and not those who fell today [pounds table twice], but those who fell 120 years ago. I think about those who fell at that time in order to create a republic where justice and law would prevail—a decent republic where there would not be corruption, impunity, dishonesty, embezzlement. They fell for an honorable, respectable country. They fell in two wars of independence, and they have fallen throughout this century. They are the ones I think about, the many, and many valuable comrades who fell. I also think about the loved ones who lost them. I think of those who have died carrying out internationalist missions, honorable internationalist missions. It is on behalf of them, that we do not have any other alternative but to do what we are doing. It is on behalf of the ideals and of the fatherland that they loved, that we feel obligated to be severe.

Therefore, comrades, I believe that with the points of view having been amply expressed, I add myself to the opinion that all of you have expressed this afternoon.

In any case, although we have heard that opinion, I ask that we officially vote.

Those in favor of the ratification of the sentence handed down by the military tribunal raise your hands. [video shows Council of State members as they vote]

Those opposed [raise your hands].

By unanimity of the Council of State, the sentence of the special military tribunal is ratified. The session has ended.

Vice Foreign Minister in UK To Attend Forum

FL1207153189 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1402 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] Jose R. Viera, first vice foreign minister of Cuba, has begun an official visit to Great Britain where he has met with parliamentarians of the Conservative and Labor Parties.

Viera is participating in the conference entitled, "The United States and Its Neighbors to the South, Relations With Mexico and Central America." On Thursday, he will make a presentation on the topic, "The Relationship Between Internal Affairs and International Obligations in the Western Hemisphere."

The Cuban vice foreign minister has met in Great Britain with parliamentarian Michael Starr of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Conservative Party, as well as members of the Friendship With Cuba Association. Viera also met with (George Bush), spokesman for the Latin American affairs section of the Labor Party; (Timothy Edgar), parliamentarian and deputy secretary of state; and Gordon Mc Lennan of the Communist Party.

Caricom

Minister Embarrassed by British National Anthem

FL0807024789 Bridgetown CANA in English 2339 GMT 7 Jul 89

[Text] St George's, Grenada, July 7, CANA—John Osbourne, the leader of the only Caribbean Community (Caricom) state which is still a British colony, says that he is embarrassed by the playing of the British national anthem for his island during regional fora.

"I must admit that it embarrasses me to hear the national anthem of England being played for another Caricom partner," he told CANA.

Osbourne admitted that there are several people in his homeland who are against the island breaking its colonial ties with Britain and going the independent road. He said these people are fearful of independence "without any good reason."

Osbourne was, however, optimistic that with the passage of time, the opponents of independence would soon change and begin to see the wisdom of making Monsterrat an independent state.

Dominican Republic

7,500 Doctors Begin 3-Day Walkout

FL1207135389 Bonaire Trans World Radio in English 1130 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] In the Dominican Republic, doctors have begun their third strike in less than a month. About 7,500 doctors who work in public hospitals began a 3-day walkout yesterday. The doctors are demanding a twofold increase in salary, the right to participate in government medical insurance, home purchase programs, and duty-free automobile imports.

Haiti

Avril Comments on Country's Serious Situation

FL1207174689 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1700 GMT 12 GMT Jul 89

[Text] Reports from Haiti indicate that the situation has abruptly worsened in that Caribbean island while newspapers are carrying rumors about a possible coup attempt.

Haitian President General Prosper Avril told a group of foreign journalists that the situation is so serious that no one's safety can be guaranteed, not even his own.

Three civilians died during the past few days in Port-au-Prince in clashes between the population and the army, while a soldier of the presidential guard, who shot at several people in a plaza, was lynched by eyewitnesses.

For months now, Avril has been trying different plans to get aid from the United States so he can remain in power. Last March, he met in Port-au-Prince with the U.S. ambassador who advised him to centralize all the power, as well as the provisional electoral council. Sources who asked to remain anonymous said that Washington also proposed constructing a military base in Haiti, which is already under construction in an unspecified location.

Students at Delpe Wake Call for Mobilization

FL1207225989 Port-au-Prince Radio Haiti-Inter in Creole 1000 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Excerpts] [Announcer Sonny] There was a wake yesterday for Gregory Delpe, whom a group of armed thugs murdered inside his residence. Feneh [National Federation of Haitian Students] paid Gregory a final homage. Jean Laurent was there.

[Jean Laurent] Yes, Sonny. [passage omitted] Today we are crying, but they will pay tomorrow. One day we will stop counting our dead. We have been wearing black armbands for too long. [passage omitted] Today it is Gregory; tomorrow it will be someone else. Let's organize so we can stop crying all the time. [passage omitted] There must be vigilance brigades for legitimate self-defense. Gregory, trouble the sleep of your murderers!

It is with such words that students from several university schools; grade school students; professors; representatives of diverse union, people's, and human rights organizations; and representatives of peasants groups held a wake at the Faculty of Sciences from 1700 to 2030 for Gregory Delpe, whose body has not returned to his family yet.

At first there were 200 people, then 400, (?then 100, at the end of the wake)—(?enough) people to eulogize Gregory Delpe. [passage omitted]

This is what was said at the end of the wake:

[Begin unidentified speaker recording] [Passage omitted] We have heard, for 4 hours, many messages of solidarity from different groups: workers, students, teachers. [passage omitted] Among those of us here, who will not be here tomorrow? We can't answer, and we'll never be able to answer as long as the people who are supposed to provide security for us, and protect us, attack us daily. [passage omitted]

Thus, the Federation's message today, besides all the things we feel as students and as people who knew Gregory, also carries the feeling and commitment that everyone here today should feel: This has to stop! We are tired of counting our dead. [end recording]

Family Refutes Police Statements

FL1207224089 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 2200 GMT 10 Jul 89

[Excerpts] In response to the Port-au-Prince police version of events regarding the murder of Gregory Delpe, the Delpe family in turn held a press conference this morning to express their indignation over statements made in the introduction of the investigation into the death of young Gregory Delpe.

The Delpe family counterattacked. [passage omitted] The family insisted on setting things straight during a press conference held today, Monday, at their residence. One after another, the Delpe family members took the floor: the father, the mother, the three sisters, and the three brothers. Point by point, they contradicted the statements made by Lieutenant Colonel [rank as heard] Jodel Lessage.

What are the police trying to insinuate, the Delpe family wonders.

[Begin unidentified speaker recording, in Creole] When I heard the introduction made by Jodel Lessage, I noticed he expressed his condolences to those profoundly and sincerely moved by the death of Gregory Delpe. He made no mention of Gregory's family. That is the first thing that struck us.

The second thing that we noticed was that the speaker declared—and I find this serious—that if Gregory Delpe, the person killed, had not left his room, he would not have been killed.

How does Lessage know this? This is very important, and I find this statement very serious! How does Lt Col Jodel Lessage know that if Gregory had not left his room he would not have died? And he said this [words indistinct].

The third point: We are astonished by the fact that they did not dust for fingerprints along the probable route that we told them the intruders might have taken.

Fourth, according to our interpretation of the information they gave—the way he presented the information—it is as if he were trying to insinuate, (?according to the way he said it), that the statements made by the family contradict what the police have found thus far. What I would like to ask them is: What are they insinuating? Does that mean that we lied? Are they saying that we are lying? And if we are lying, why are we lying? What interest do we have in lying? [end recording]

Contrary to what Lt Col Jodel Lessage said, the Delpe family had an authorization from the justice of the peace to move Gregory's body to a private morgue. The family is astonished that the police did not dust for fingerprints. There was indeed blood, contrary to what the police spokesman said, said Clarel Delpe, the victim's brother who arrived on the scene a few minutes after the incident occurred.

The family warned the police against trying to arrest any members of the family.

[Begin unidentified speaker recording, in Creole] If they think that they can come and take away any member of the family, they will have to take us all away, because we all saw what happened. [end recording] [passage omitted]

As of the 10th day of July, there have already been eight murders this month. [passage omitted] We trust the police will waste no time in giving us precise details regarding these murders too.

Details of Press Conference

FL1307011089 Port-au-Prince Radio Haiti-Inter in Creole 1000 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The Delpe family held its own news conference, on which we will report this morning.

The entire family was present—mother, father, brothers and sisters—to say what they knew about the murder of Gregory Delpe and to refute the police press conference. They were also present to say: Respect the truth! [passage omitted]

The second thing that emerged from the press conference: The thugs did not say that Turneb Delpe was the only political leader who was preventing the government from working. The thugs said the same thing to the mother and the father. [passage omitted]

They press conference was held to refute the police press conference point by point.

The police said that there were no signs of a break-in or fingerprints or footprints anywhere. They found nothing like that. The Delpes say the lock on one gate has disappeared and the lock on another is open. Also, the grocery store was found open, and they found a candle that had been lit inside the grocery store. [passage omitted]

Regarding the family's so-called managing to move the body, the Delpe's exhibited a photocopy of the authorization given them by the judge to do so. It was also a judge, in the presence of a police brigade, who took formally noted the amount of blood on the victim's body. However, now the police are trying to claim that when the police arrived, they found only a thin trickle of blood. The Delpes said that they had indeed cleaned up the room, but only after the judge's formal report was written up. The fact that Gregory was covered in blood can be vouched for by the neighbors, the ambulance attendants, and the Delpes themselves.

Turneb Delpe never said he was very familiar with weapons, say the Delpes. In the statements he made to the press, Turneb said he sometimes leafed through books on weapons. He said he had seen such books in the United States, where he has lived. [passage omitted]

According to Carel Delpe, who lived in the room before he got married and left the house, the bullet holes in the ceiling have always been there. [passage omitted]

At the end of the press conference, the Delpes said they were still planning to bury Gregory on Wednesday of this week.

Police Chief Henri Robert Augustin appeared at the Delpe house twice during the press conference, accompanied by the public prosecutor. The two of them said they had come to ask the family to choose a doctor to perform the autopsy, which was scheduled for noon.

This same team appeared at the Delpe house Sunday afternoon, right after the police press conference. They came to take pictures and ask questions, mainly of Dr Turneb Delpe, the secretary general of the PNDPH [National Democratic and Progressive Party of Haiti], who refused to answer questions without his lawyer present. He said one of the reasons he refused to answer was because he wondered why he was being questioned, whereas everyone in the house was witness to the incident.

Sunday afternoon, when the family got tired and asked the team to leave. Within an hour, a vehicle had appeared and (?made a U-turn) in front of the Delpe house and fired off a volley of shots. It seems that this morning, while the press conference was going on, (?in a conversation, near) the Delpe house, the chief of police said that the police had been shot at in the area. However, according to the Delpe family, as soon as this happened on Sunday afternoon, they called the police, who said they were coming, but never showed up. [passage omitted]

Decree Increases Number of FADH Troops

FL1307003189 Port-au-Prince LE NOUVELLISTE in French No 33.580, 10 Jul 89 p 1

["Decree Increasing the Number of Enlisted Men in the Line Service of the Haitian Armed Forces"—LE NOUVELLISTE headline]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Article 1—The number of enlisted men in the line service of the Haitian Armed Forces [FADH] has been increased by 393 men, distributed as follows:

sergeant-majors 1
sergeants first class [premier-sergeant] 3
quartermaster sergeants 14
sergeants 35
corporals 75
privates first class 83
privates 182
Total number of troops 393

Article 2—These new troops will be added to the enlisted men of the Heavy Vehicle Corps [Corps des Engins Lourds].

Article 3—This modification will be covered by money available under Article 1305 of the budget.

Conacom Appeals to Military Over Insecurity

FL1207221889 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1600 GMT 10 Jul 89

[Excerpt] In a press release addressed to the press and the interim Army commander in chief [General Herard Abraham], Conacom [National Committee of the Congress of Democratic Movements] expresses its concern regarding the insecurity to the military authorities.

We read: Horrified by the climate of insecurity, which has reached intolerable limits—with terrorist threats against peaceful citizens, an increase in repression against the peasants in certain areas, suspicious fires in Saint-Marc and Cap-Haitien, armed robberies, nighttime and even daytime murders—Conacom's secretariat feels it must appeal to the military heirarchy's sense of responsibility. This appeal is all the more justified because, along with the hateful murder of student and instructor Gregory Delpe, one of the stars in the firmament of Haitian youth, we are beginning to notice among the population, aggressive looking civilians walking around the streets with automatic pistols strapped to their waists.

Therefore, a confused population is beginning to ask itself the following questions: Is the country once again living in a period similar to that of the Duvaliers, during which the paramilitary forces could allow themselves anything because they were guided by an executive that did not respect the law and could count on the complicity of certain cadres within a disoriented and humiliated Army?

Is it possible that despite the democratic breeze blowing through all the nation's institutions since 7 February 1986 and 17 September 1988, the Army and the police are being manipulated from inside by agents in the hire [solde] of the antidemocratic forces, wonders Conacom, stating its opinion on the insecurity. [passage omitted]

Plan To Ease Insecurity Urged

FL1307004289 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in Creole 1300 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Excerpts] In connection with the insecurity, Conacom [National Committee of the Congress of Democratic Movements] has addressed a note to the interim commander in chief of the Armed Forces, General Herard Abraham. [passage omitted]

Conacom feels what is going on in Haiti is intolerable. People cannot accept it. [passage omitted]

Conacom wonders about the wind of insecurity blowing throughout Haiti. It thinks that (?because of) the thrust by the death squads, and in view of the fact that the insecurity appears to be too much for the Haitian Army and the police to handle, many citizens are suggesting that everyone defend themselves any way they can because the Haitian Army is incapable of solving the problem which has spread all over the country.

As legitimate as this tendency may be, Conacom says, it risks creating in Haiti a climate of chaos with all its negative consequences, which might endanger the national sovereignty.

In order to avoid (?the worst), Conacom recommends concerted action by all patriots both military and civilian with a view to quickly preparing an emergency plan to combat the insecurity in Haiti. [passage omitted]

Still in connection with the insecurity, a Haitian Government decree dated 30 June 1989 ratifies the contract for a loan for $2 million—10 million gourdes—concluded on 26 June 1989 between the Haitian Government and the Port-au-Prince branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia. This money is to be used to help the Haitian Government meet (?emergency) expenditures consisting exclusively of the acquisition [announcer rephrases] to allow the government to obtain radio communications equipment and transportation materials in order to strengthen the apparatus established to ensure the security of the Haitian people. This information comes from the Ministry of Information and Coordination.

Sixth Group of Detectives Summoned by Police

FL1307002189 Port-au-Prince LE MATIN in French No 26.764, 8 Jul 89 pp 2, 5

[From the "Haiti and Today's World" column; all names as published]

[Text] In follow-up to the Ministry of Interior and National Defense communique of 19 May 1989, the Port-au-Prince police ask the following, sixth, group of former Dessalines Barracks detectives to bring into police general headquarters on the Champ de Mars, as soon as possible, the weapons and cards in their possession: Iman Soleman, Hugues Paris, Andre Cherilus, Georges Fritz, Jean Jacques Meister, Yva R. Latortue, Albert Dufort, William Georges, Claudy Jean, Deslandes Brun, William Maitre, Nicolas Derise, Detlet Schulz, Frid Espere, Lesly Olivier, Lesly Goutier, Yvon St-Juste, Liautaud Dubors, Mrs Elie Andre, and Joel Fortune.

By order of Colonel Augustin.

[Signed] Jodel Lessage, executive officer in charge of public relations.

Government Takes Measures To Bolster Gourde

FL1307000589 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1045 GMT 10 Jul 89

[Excerpt] As we announced in our headlines, the cost of the U.S. dollar is now lower, thanks to the latest government measures taken to lower the cost of living and return the gourde its former value in comparison to the U.S. dollar. The government measures announced at the beginning of last weekend have already had some effects. The U.S. dollar, which was at 35 percent, has dropped to 20 percent. Merchants and the population will be able to breathe a bit easier, Rothschild.

[Reporter Rothschild] Yes, Proper Avril's government has undertaken a war against inflation and the decline of the gourde on the parallel market. At the recommendation of the tripartite commission, created recently by the government to rule on the rise in the cost of strategic products, the government issued two decrees at the beginning of this weekend.

Under the first decree, the government recognizes a commercial category called transfer banks. Any and all businesses other than commercial banks engaging in the transfer of currency between the local and international markets are considered transfer banks. These businesses will be authorized to operate upon endorsement by the Ministry of Finance, and upon requesting endorsement, the applicant must first present a 250,000-gourde deposit.

The decree also stipulates that the transfer businesses must use the rate of 5 gourdes to $1 for their U.S. dollar operations. For other currencies, the conversion rate is to be fixed at regular intervals by the central bank.

These businesses will also obligatorily deposit, in a checking account at the bank, the foreign currency received from abroad. Issuances [les tirages] will be made in gourdes at the rate of 5 gourdes to the dollar—and, for other currencies, at the rate set by the BRH [Banque de la Republique d'Haiti, the Central Bank].

The businesses considered transfer businesses have 1 month to conform to the dispositions of this decree.

We point out that those who fail to comply with this government decree (?aimed at) protecting the savings of overseas Haitians and encouraging small- and medium-sized businesses will incur severe sanctions.

In the second decree dated 7 July, the government wishes to at all costs protect the gourde, the national currency. The transfer businesses and the commercial banks must turn over to the BRH all of the foreign currency generated by export operations and transactions of all kinds—in particular, all payments made from abroad to transfer businesses, shipping lines, and nongovernmental pro-development agencies.

Also according to this decree, the ONG [nongovernmental organizations], the shipping lines, or any other such organization will turn over to a commercial bank all checks in foreign currency made out to them. In order to permit the commercial banks to cover their clientele's operations, the central bank will give back to them in foreign currency a percentage of the amount of foreign currency turned over to it. This percentage will be set by BRH through a circular. Part of this currency allocated will be reserved for the importation of needed articles of prime necessity according to priorities set by Prosper Avril's government.

The foreign currency left to the disposal of the commercial banks outside the priorities set by the government will be used only for real imports, or to meet certain essential needs of the banks' clients. Under no circumstances, stresses the decree, may the banks use the currency in their possession to speculate against the gourde on the parallel market. The commercial banks must also provide the central bank with a weekly report justifying the use of the foreign currency in their possession.

It is also forbidden for anyone to demand payment in foreign currency for transactions in which payments are made on Haitian territory. Anyone entering Haiti with more than 15,000 gourdes in local currency will also be obliged to declare the amount of money they have in their possession to the customs authorities. Such persons will not be allowed to leave Haiti with the exchange value in foreign currency.

For the supervision of the recommendations made in this decree, the government has formed a committee made up of: Mr (Serge Merger), of the Foreign Ministry, president; Mrs (Yolette Azor Charles), of the Ministry of

Commerce, member; (Margareth Charles), of the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, member; and Mr Claude Pierre-Louis, secretary general. The members of this committee have been appointed for 1-year terms and will not be paid by the government.

Meanwhile, the promulgation of these decrees has begun to have effects on the exchange market. One day after their publication, the dollar, which was rising, dropped spectacularly, going from 35 percent on Friday to 20 percent on Saturday. The street money-changers are in a panic. They claim to have lost money because of this drop in the exchange rate of the dollar. [passage omitted]

Man Killed in Miragoane Identified as Soldier

FL1207222889 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 2200 GMT 10 Jul 89

[Excerpts] There have been more incidents: more precisely, in Miragoane, where yesterday a man who was today identified as a sergeant from the [Investigations and] Anti-Gang Service and 10 other people were hurt. The sergeant was shot and killed, and the 10 other people either suffered bullet wounds or were hurt in clashes following an incident that occurred yesterday on Petite Anse beach in Miragoane. [passage omitted]

In reaction to the incident, the population of Miragoane set up barricades, damaged cars, and killed one of the armed men and wounded three others. The (?other) people's identities have not yet been revealed. [passage omitted] We also learned today that the Miragoane police have made some arrests in connection with this incident.

Public Administration Appointments Announced

FL1207222189 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1045 GMT 10 Jul 89

[Text] The Directorate of Information of the Ministry [of Information and Coordination] has announced the following appointments within the public administration:

(Laurence P.O. Noel) has been appointed director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the rank of ambassador.

(Nicolas Sommet) has been appointed director general of the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development.

By presidential commission, (Jean Bercerand) has been appointed director of the National Office for the Development of Animal Husbandry [Office Nationale de Developement de la Production Animale]; Mr (Serge Petit) has been appointed administrative director of the National Telecommunications Council, Conatel; and Mr (Bernauvil Audate) has been appointed judge at the Special Labor Court of Port-au-Prince.

Peasant Cadres Denounce Bishops' Actions

FL1207224989 Port-au-Prince Radio Haiti-Inter in Creole 1000 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Text] Here is a note of solidarity with the Radio Soleil team.

We, 20 members of AKPA, Association of Haitian Peasant Cadres [Asosyasyon Kad Peyizan Ayisyen], wish to raise our voices to denounce the big plot and crooked wheeling and dealing against the Haitian people that the Haitian bishops are engaged in. Bishops, can you not see that you have declared a weaponless war on God's people? When we see what you are doing, frankly, it tears out our guts, to see what the bishops, the Church's highest authorities, are doing!

Just listen to all the awful things the bishops have done to the Haitian people: First, they changed the orientation of Caritas, which is one of the Church institutions that used to support God's people through all the bad times suffered under the macoutes.

They dismantled Misyon Alfa [Catholic Church literacy program], which existed to wash the Haitian people's eyes clear, to chase the black clouds out of their eyes.

They shunted aside Father Titide [affectionate nickname for Father Jean Bertrand Aristide] because he supported the struggle of the Haitian people, who were crying out in protest against abject poverty.

The bishop of Cap-Haitien dismantled Radio La Voix de l'Ave Maria in Cap-Haitien.

They shut down the Petit Seminaire in Les Cayes to make way for an American university so that it could confuse the ideas and the minds of Haitian youth.

They are dismantling Radio Men Kontre in Les Cayes.

The final blow: They destroyed Radio Soleil, along with its entire team of progressive journalists—the very journalists who stood at the crossroads of death and took a firm stand at the side of the Haitian people when they were having difficulties with the macoutes who were attempting to rough them up.

My goodness, Bishops! Are you trying to settle some kind of score with the Haitian people, or what! Huh?

In Haiti, when it is a matter of doing something in the interests of the bigshots (?and/or) the Americans, the bishops are very submissive, fall right in line and collaborate marvelously; yet they are sullying the Haitian people (?by means of) all kinds of arbitrary decisions they are making against the will of God's people.

Why, Bishops, it looks as if only you yourselves are capable of understanding things. Is that what you think? We ourselves know that God loves everyone alive,

regardless of his status in the society—especially the suffering masses. It is at their side that Jesus stood! Why is it that you, Lords [seigneurs], are on the side of the macoutes who are drinking the people's blood?

In solidarity with the Radio Soleil team, there are 20 members of AKPA, Association of Haitian Peasant Cadres.

Organization Created To Protect Cane Workers

FL1307012589 Port-au-Prince L'UNION in French No 169, 11 Jul 89 p 2

[Text] We inform the public of the creation of an organization called "Sant Pwomosyon Moun" [Center for the Promotion of People], whose acronym is Sapwomoun. This organization's main objective is to stop the emigration of peasants to the sugarcane fields of the Dominican Republic. Furthermore, it will also be the organization's mission to call the public's attention to everything connected with the braceros [Haitian agricultural laborers].

We hope that all the people and organizations interested in the bracero problem will join us in order to help us attain the proposed objectives.

[signed] Herold Jean-Francois, in charge of public relations. Dr Paul Etienne, executive director.

Trinidad and Tobago

Judge Grants Bail to Alleged Drug Dealers

FL0707210189 Bridgetown CANA in English 1637 GMT 7 Jul 89

[Text] Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, July 7, CANA—A Trinidadian high court judge has overturned a colleague's decision to deny bail to six men accused of trafficking in illegal drugs. Justice Zainool Hosein on Thursday ruled that Justice Aeneus Wills had contravened the constitutional right to bail of the six men.

The six has been charged with cultivating and possessing marijuana and possession of arms and ammunition. They were granted bail in March by a Justice of the Peace. But the TT 1.2 million dollars bail was later revoked by a magistrate. The six took their case before Justice Wills who also denied the application for bail.

However, Justice Hosein said Thursday that Trinidad and Tobago's Constitution provided a fixed right for bail and any changes to the contrary would have to come from the parliament and the legislature.

Two years ago, government's attempts to remove bail for drug offences led to a public outcry which resulted in two draft bills being withdrawn.

Costa Rica

Arias on Ortega's Upcoming Visit, Panama

PA1207150489 San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 1230 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega will visit Costa Rica on 14 July to meet with Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. Arias announced that Ortega will make a 6-hour visit to our country. Ortega will arrive on board a Sandinist military airplane at approximately 1000 to hold several working sessions with Arias. Ortega will return to Managua that night. The topics of the meeting will be Nicaragua's preparations for the 25 February 1990 elections and the Central American presidents' summit scheduled for early August in Honduras.

Arias said that he will ask Ortega to comply with the Esquipulas agreements. Although he declined to comment on the specific points to be discussed during Ortega's visit, Arias confirmed that he will ask Ortega to comply with the Esquipulas agreements. Arias has often complained about Nicaragua's failure to comply with several major points in the peace agreements. The topics to be discussed during the Arias-Ortega meeting include political openings and electoral reforms for opposition parties, as well as freedom for the media.

Nicaraguan First Lady Rosario Murillo will arrive in Costa Rica on the morning of 13 July to attend a cultural program at the invitation of Costa Rican First Lady Margarita Penon. Taking advantage of his wife's visit, Commander Ortega also accepted an invitation from Oscar Arias to come to Costa Rica. The Nicaraguan president will be accompanied by National Assembly First Secretary Rafael Solis and Supreme Electoral Council official Joaquin Cuadra, since the topics to be discussed deal with that country's elections.

President Arias did not rule out meetings in the days ahead with other Central American presidents here or in other countries. Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani is scheduled to visit the country on 16 July to attend the championship soccer finals. Arias also said that he is planning a tour of Central America because he wants the presidents' summit set for 6, 7, and 8 August in Honduras to lead to specific agreements that will contribute to peace.

Arias also said that Panama cannot belong to the Central American Parliament unless there is democracy in that country. He said that the parliament includes countries that signed the Esquipulas agreements, adding that although it would be very good if Panama joined, it cannot do so until there is democracy in that country. The president feels that efforts must focus on getting the countries that signed the agreement to abide by its terms in order to establish the Central American Parliament. Once that happens, and Panama becomes a democracy, one can think of letting it join the Central American Parliament, Arias noted. Developments resulting from Panama's 7 May elections are still drawing the world's attention to that country.

Therefore, democracy must exist in Panama before one can consider allowing Panama to join the Central American Parliament, he said. The Costa Rican president's remarks came in response to comments made in Panama by several Central American lawmakers, including Costa Rica's Alfonso Esteban Estevanovich and Fernando Jimenez. Panama's admittance to that parliament is not ruled out, but first there has to be political change and a democratic opening in which the people's will prevails, the president said.

El Salvador

Opposition Accused of Siding With FMLN

PA1207221689 San Salvador Canal Seis Television in Spanish 0200 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Report by Joel Burgos]

[Text] Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani has blasted the opposition parties for failing to join the government commission on dialogue. He accused the opposition parties of playing into the hands of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] guerrillas and seeking to destabilize his government. He made those remarks to newsmen gathered for a seminar entitled: Journalism in a society in crisis. The seminar was organized by the Association of Salvadoran Journalists under the auspices of the U.S. Embassy. He described recent remarks about his government by the opposition parties as a propaganda ploy.

[Begin Cristiani recording] Turning their backs on the Salvadoran people for their own political purposes, the opposition parties are playing into the hands of the FMLN. The refusal of some political figures to join the commission on dialogue to reinforce our peace proposal with the participation of a broad spectrum of Salvadoran society is also an (?indirect) way of playing into FMLN hands. They are irresponsibly following the same strategic policy of our people's chief enemy. [end recording]

The chief opposition parties refused to join the commission on dialogue, which the government planned to establish. According to analysts, this means they do not give credence to the government's plans to hold talks with the (?rebels). The president, who inaugurated the newsmen's seminar at the San Salvador hotel, defended his government's stand supporting bills to amend the penal code and penal procedure codes, currently being debated at the Legislative Assembly.

[Begin Cristiani recording] As part of their campaign to discredit me, some sectors have circulated documents falsely attributed to the government so as to deceive the public and lead them to believe that the reforms are designed to curtail freedom of thought and expression. The facts have clearly exposed this propaganda ploy. [end recording]

These amendment bills have brought about a domestic debate where the guerrillas, political parties, and labor sectors have played a key role. According to the opposition, these bills, which have been described as antiterrorist laws, seek among other things to repress freedom of expression.

Gen Rene Ponce on Dialogue, FMLN Actions

PA1307025589 San Salvador Canal Seis Television in Spanish 0200 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Report by Joel Burgos—passages within quotation marks recorded]

[Text] Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce, chairman of the Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, said today that the latest military operations against the guerrillas in the capital's urban areas are designed to exert pressure on the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front so that it will agree to talk with Alfredo Cristiani's administration. The Army has launched military campaigns in the urban area, which has been the site of rebel actions.

[Ponce] "The Armed Forces will respect and support the government's decision to begin a dialogue because it is a political decision. [President Alfredo Cristiani] announced this on 1 June, but the FMLN has not agreed to the talks. Anyway, I believe that a dialogue is to exchange views between two sides—in this case representatives of the Salvadoran people and the FMLN, which is attacking the Salvadoran people."

[Burgos] "Colonel, if the guerrillas [words indistinct] then what would be left?"

[Ponce] "We are exerting more military pressure precisely to force them to sit down and participate in a dialogue. Otherwise, they can leave our country and go to other countries where they have friends—Nicaragua, Cuba, or any country in the Soviet bloc."

The guerrillas have rejected the government commission. The same attitude has been adopted by opposition political parties that (?demand) to be part of the commission. [sentence as received] The chairman of the Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff also said that the guerrillas could be operating with cells that have been trained in Cuba and Nicaragua. Col Ponce asserted that there is enough evidence about those countries' support to the Salvadoran rebels.

[Ponce] "Yes, FMLN death squads are operating in San Salvador. They call them urban commandos and they consist of six or seven members who have been trained in Nicaragua. They are experts in terrorist techniques and the use of explosives; and they have carried out attacks on important figures in the country's political life."

Defense Minister on Casualties, Human Rights

PA1307015989 San Salvador Canal Seis Television in Spanish 0200 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Report by Joel Burgos—passages within quotation marks recorded]

[Text] Today, Defense Minister Rafael Humberto Larios reported to the Legislative Assembly that the two sides that have been at war since early this decade sustained over 6,500 casualties over the past year.

[Larios] "Wounded in action 2,434; missing 21. Enemy casualties: Killed in action 1,111; wounded 1,090; captured 1,630—997 of these were released and 633 were arraigned in court; [word indistinct], 58. The number of captured include armed terrorist criminals, collaborators, and suspects."

According to the minister, who arrived accompanied by Defense Vice Minister Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda, Public Security Vice Minister Inocente Orlando Montano, and Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce, chairman of the Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Armed Forces' support to the democratic process has prevented social unrest.

[Larios] "The efforts exerted by the Armed Forces and the support given to the democratic process have prevented the social unrest with which the subversives are trying to justify an overall uprisal. You may rest assured that this will not happen in El Salvador."

"Terrorist forces and their front organizations will continue insisting on the need for a dialogue that favors their interests. They will try to increase their terrorist actions by sabotaging the country's economic infrastructure and carrying out murders—selective in some cases and indiscriminate in others—with the intention of seeking political and propagandistic advantages, particularly abroad."

Another important factor of the defense minister's report was what General Rafael Humberto Larios called the enforcement of the human rights' principle.

[Larios] "Thus, and to fully enforce the principles of respect for human rights, during this period we were particularly strict with members of our Armed Forces who countered permanent orders and made grave errors or committed crimes. One commander, 13 officers, and 210 troop members were expelled and arraigned in court when their conduct so demanded."

Reportage on Clashes Between Army, Guerrillas

9 Jul Rebel Ambush

PA1207131889 (Clandestine) Radio Venceremos in Spanish to El Salvador 0000 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Text] A guerrilla unit ambushed a convoy of seven vehicles on the coastal highway at 0900 on 9 July, inflicting 20 casualties. The ambush was staged on the stretch between Tierra Blanca and the 14 July neighborhood in Jiquilisco jurisdiction, Usulutan Department. The seven-vehicle convoy was carrying 6th Infantry Brigade troops and was heading west. The convoy was protected by three armored personnel carriers. Three powerful Atonal-type mines were set off, partially damaging (?one) vehicle and inflicting 20 casualties. Our unit withdrew without problems. The military High Command cannot solve the problem of guerrilla ambushes. Even though three armored personnel carriers were protecting a seven-vehicle convoy, we still managed to ambush it.

Another guerrilla unit ambushed a military truck transporting Marines from San Miguel at 0445 on 9 July. The ambush occurred on the Pan-American highway, near Los Jobos in Apastepeque jurisdiction, San Vicente Department. The vehicle was destroyed by explosives. It is estimated that the Marines sustained 12 casualties.

11 Jul Clashes

PA1207230489 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSU in Spanish 1400 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Text] We have a last minute report: One Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] guerrilla fighter died a few hours ago when his column clashed with members of the Ramon Belloso Battalion near Zaragoza, La Libertad Department. Following the incident, the Army seized one AK-47 rifle and one radio.

Military sources in northern Chalatenango Department report that combined forces of the Cobra Battalion, 4th Infantry Brigade, and 1st Infantry Brigade seized 18 M-16 rifles, 1 light antitank weapon, 7,000 rounds of ammunition, and other war materiel in Cerro El Penasco, near La Reina.

Also, last evening members of the Cavalry Regiment clashed with a rebel column in Quebrada El Zapote, near San Jose Guayabal. There were no casualties.

Meanwhile, fierce fighting occurred early this morning at the outskirts of Guazapa, 24 km northeast of San Salvador. Civilian sources from the area confirmed the information, but reported no casualties. Military sources have yet to report these grave incidents which have alarmed the people living in Guazapa.

Coprefa on Rebel Actions

PA1307033689 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSU in Spanish 1815 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Report from the Armed Forces Press Committee—live or recorded]

[Text] The National Guard in Zacatecoluca has reported that FMLN terrorists assassinated Carmen Gordiano, mayor of San Francisco Chinameca, La Paz Department, 2 days ago. According to the information, the terrorists injected him with a poisonous product that he was using to spray his crops in Tipitapa, Canton Candelaria.

Also, FMLN terrorists disguised as civil defense members assassinated Lorenzo Escobar near Canton Las Cruces, Santa Ana jurisdiction. Furthermore, the FMLN kidnapped Gilberto Garcia Flores, who worked as overseer at

Finca El Matazano, Santiago Nonualco jurisdiction, La Paz Department. The victim's relatives have requested the cooperation of human rights groups to attain his release.

Urban terrorists yesterday used explosives to destroy a telephone exchange box located at 5th North Avenue and 3d East Street in San Salvador. The explosion also damaged four private houses; the owners have condemned the FMLN action.

Atlacatl Battalion troops also destroyed 11 booby traps that terrorists had set up in Canton Los Mazariego, Canton La Cruz, and Canton Montepeque, San Jose Guayabal jurisdiction, Cuscatlan Department. The 5th Military Detachment also destroyed six booby traps in Loma El Papayal, Cinquera jurisdiction, Cabanas Department.

Honduras

University Official Killed in San Pedro Sula

PA1207171789 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1447 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] Tegucigalpa, 12 Jul (ACAN-EFE)—The police reported today that Roberto Garay, director of the northern region branch of the National Autonomous University of Honduras, was shot to death last night by two unidentified men in San Pedro Sula, the country's second largest city. According to the official reports, the professor was killed at 2100 (0300 GMT) inside his garage.

Witnesses said that the professor arrived at his house with his wife and daughter and that unidentified individuals waited until the two women entered the house before opening fire on the professor. The coroner confirmed that Garay's body was hit by nine bullets from 9-mm semiautomatic pistols.

Garay was an adviser of the right-wing United Democratic University Front (FUUD), in which he had been active during his student days.

In the past few months, several student, peasant, and labor leaders, most with left-wing sympathies, have been killed in San Pedro Sula.

Nicaragua

Venezuelan President on Nicaraguan Elections

PA1207214989 Managua Sistema Sandinista de Television Network in Spanish 0200 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Report on interview with Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez on 10 July in Caracas; questions by unidentified reporters—recorded]

[Text] Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez met with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega on 10 July during a stopover by the latter in Caracas. Perez had a conciliatory attitude and seemed to be satisfied with the Revolutionary Government's advances in the electoral field. After the meeting, both presidents granted a news conference.

[Begin recording] [Reporter, broadcast in progress] ...Nicaraguan election process and your meeting with Daniel today?

[Perez] My impression is that great progress has been made. However, at the same time I told President Ortega that we would like to see a broad agreement reached with the opposition parties so that the elections will show the world what we all want the Nicaraguan Sandinist Revolution to show, that is, a process in which democracy is really the main factor. We also wish that all Nicaraguans could live in their homeland, which has suffered so much for so many years. The country is currently living amid a period of calm because, fortunately, the war has come to a standstill. However, that standstill is not enough; we would like to see every possibility of an armed conflict eliminated and Nicaraguan citizens, through votes, decide Nicaragua's status.

[Reporter] You have met here with Nicaraguan opposition leaders who have visited you and now you have met with the Nicaraguan president; you can give us your opinion because you are a very clever politician...

[Perez, interrupting] No, not clever. I am anguished about the difficult situations Latin America is confronting. I have met with representatives from the Nicaraguan oppostion parties, and I plan to do so again in the near future because we want to collaborate. We understand that the Central American problem is a problem for all of Latin America, not just for Nicaragua. We have always encouraged every effort by President Ortega to carry out a process that will satisfy all groups in Nicaragua.

[Reporter] President Perez, does your anguish over the Central American situation include U.S. intentions to financially suppport, through the U.S. Congress, actions that could hamper the electoral process?

[Perez] On the contrary. We have always been against—and I have never said this in secret, but loudly—any intervention in Nicaragua's problems. We have always opposed the war that has caused so much damage in Central America.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] the electoral commission that visited Nicaragua?

[Perez] The electoral commission that visited Nicaragua has broadly analyzed the situation and fortunately has contributed to the organization of the Nicaraguan electoral process. It will continue to give its support to Nicaraguan electoral authorities. They have expressed optimism. They hope that all the objectives sought for the opposition's broad participation will be achieved.

[Reporter] When will you return to Nicaragua?

[Perez] I want to go to Nicaragua to congratulate you for an electoral process that will definitely eliminate the dark clouds that have loomed over Central American.

[Reporter] What do you think about the candidacy of Violeta [Chamorro]?

[Perez] You know that I admire and love Violeta very much. I have been her friend since the days of Pedro Joaquin, when we were exiled together in Nicaragua... [corrects himself] in Costa Rica. However, I do not know whether Violeta will venture to be a presidential candidate. Who will she run against? Daniel? [laughs from reporters] [end recording]

Defense Ministry on 8-9 Jul Contra Attacks

PA1207222689 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1200 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Text] A report by the Public and Foreign Relations Directorate of the Defense Ministry indicates counterrevolutionary groups carried out two attacks on Sandinist People's Army [EPS] soldiers and kidnapped several peasants. On 8 July, at Los Cedros, southeast of Pantasma, Jinotega Department, a counterrevolutionary group attacked our troops and injured one soldier. On 9 July, in La Granja, northeast of Pantasma, the mercenaries again attacked EPS soldiers. One contra was killed, and one AK rifle was seized. Continuing their acts of terror, the mercenaries kidnapped peasants Alejandro Alrrugama and Denis Blandon in San Sebastian de Yali, Jinotega Department.

Moreover, one civilian was kidnapped on 5 July in (La Chata) area, northeast of San Sebastian de Yali. On 9 July, peasant Nelson Bautista Blandon was kidnapped in (Los Guineos) Valley, southeast of Quilali, Nueva Segovia Department.

Contras also fired at a private transportation bus at 1630 in San Francisco, located 10 kms southeast of Camaopa. Five civilians were killed almost instantly, and another

was seriously injured. The dead were identified as: Ivan Flores Telles, Martin Quintana, Miguel Espinosa, Luis Duarte, and Sergio Sancaroit. The injured person's name is Leonidas Gonzalez. Last night there were no reports of any more injured persons.

Panama

Noriega Comments on Dialogue With Opposition

PA1207141089 Panama City MATUTINO in Spanish 12 Jul 89 pp 1, 18

[Unattributed report: "General Noriega Said Yesterday: Dialogue Should Be in Santa Ana, Not in Maisto's Bedroom"]

[Text] Shortly after meeting with President Manuel Solis Palma yesterday, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander in chief of the Panama Defense Forces [FDP], said the dialogue among Panamanians should take place in Panama City's Santa Ana Square, not in the bedroom of [U.S. Charge d'Affaires John] Maisto (the mastermind of the destabilization of the Philippines and Panama).

As he left the Presidential Palace accompanied by high-ranking officers, the military leader stressed that "there are Panamanians who want a dialogue in Maisto's bedroom, and there are Panamanians who want a dialogue in Santa Ana Square."

"We are going to hold a dialogue in Santa Ana Square, not in Maisto's bedroom," he said in reference to the dialogue convened by the Authentic Panamenist Party [PPA], in which eight legally registered parties are participating.

Commenting on the opposition's absence from this dialogue, President Manuel Solis Palma said the opposition "is making a mistake" by not seeking an agreement to bring about a solution to the political situation and to the economic problems this situation has caused, which have brought suffering to all Panamanians.

Yesterday, politicians and diplomats commented on the dialogue in which the opposition is not participating. Meanwhile, pro-U.S. politicians are asking for a dialogue with the FDP.

Two high-ranking officers, Lieutenant Colonels Nivaldo Madrinan and Virgilio Mirones, are representing the FDP at the dialogue organized by the PPA. Madrinan said this is "a step to contribute to the efforts to overcome the political crisis."

Apostolic Nuncio Sebastian Laboa also referred to the dialogue and offered the nunciature as a site for a dialogue. Meanwhile, Costa Rican Deputy Otto Cerezo said the situation "is Panamanian and should be solved only by Panamanians."

ADOC Rejects Reconstruction Government Proposal

PA1307040389 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0252 GMT 13 Jul 89

[Text] Panama City, 12 Jul (ACAN-EFE)-This evening, the Panamanian opposition rejected a proposal presented by the progovernment parties to establish, as of September, a "government of national reconstruction" with representatives from the official sector, a minority group, and adversaries of the regime.

Guillermo Endara, main leader of the Civic Democratic Opposition Alliance (ADOC) who considers himself "president-elect" following the 7 May elections which were later annulled, described the proposal as a "mockery of the people."

"Our answer is no; a resounding no to that junta that would be composed of one ADOC representative and two government representatives," Endara told ACAN-EFE.

The proposal came at the conclusion of several meetings attended by Lieutenant Colonels Nivaldo Madrinan and Virgilio Mirones, representing General Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander in chief of the Panama Defense Forces [FDP].

The final communique of the meetings was signed by leaders of nine political parties, among them two presidential candidates in the annulled 7 May elections, Carlos Duque, the progovernment candidate of the National Liberation Coalition (COLINA), and Hildebrando Nicosia, leader of the minority Authentic Panamenist Party (PPA).

The lieutenant colonels who attended the meetings did not sign the proposal because Madrinan said the military will support "any solution to the Panamanian crisis."

"The opposition will have to sit down to talk. The opposition can participate in the dialogue if it wishes to do so." Madrinan, Noriega's trusted man and National Department of Investigations (DENI) director, added.

According to the proposal, the first objective of this "government of reconstruction" would be to "negotiate, as soon as possible, the release of Panamanian funds being held by the U.S. Government and the payment of the canal fees."

In early 1988, the U.S. Government froze Panamanian funds in the United States and stopped all payment of canal fees. This was part of the sanctions imposed by the United States in an attempt to force Noriega to resign as commander in chief of the FDP.

The proposal presented by the progovernment parties adds that the new government must "set the date for the next elections," and negotiate with representatives of the private enterprise and the workers an economic plan to "reactivate domestic and foreign investment in the country."

The opposition did not attend the meetings from which this proposal emerged. The opposition had invited the parties to a "national dialogue" to overcome the crisis that resulted following the annulment of the May elections; however, the progovernment groups ignored ADOC's invitation.

Endara said that the meetings of the progovernment parties with the minority PPA—the party that split from the opposition before the elections—"lack all seriousness" and are not in accord with the "tripartite dialogue" suggested in Panama by a mission sent by the OAS.

According to the OAS, the talks should have been held with the participation of the progovernment parties, the opposition, and the FDP.

According to an announcement made today in Washington, the OAS mission will return to Panama on Friday.

Opposition Party Members Reportedly Arrested

PA1207232389 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 2200 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] Panama City, 12 Jul (ACAN)—Panamanian opposition Christian Democratic Party [PDC] sources said today nine PDC leaders and members were arrested in various parts of the country during the last 24 hours and charged with distributing "subversive material."

According to statements by PDC President Ricardo Arias, the detainees were in possession of or were consignees of packages containing copies of LA ESTRELLA VERDE, the PDC's information bulletin. Arias added that two of the detainees were sentenced to an incommutable sentence of 1 year in prison for that reason.

Among those arrested is David Sanchez, who is PDC secretary general for the western Bocas del Toro Province and son of writer Guillermo Sanchez Borbon (whose pseudonym is Tristan Solarte).

The other detainees are: Wilfredo Justavino, Elias Saldana, Justo Pastor Duran, Sebastian Escobar, Luis Peralta, Pablo Hernandez, Asclepciades Espino, and Angel Perez. The last two were sentenced to 1 year in prison by Night Court Judge Wenceslao Brenmer.

The lawyers who defended the detainees said that "clear legal and constitutional provisions were violated" during those arrests.

The lawyers said: "There were no arrest warrants, and the charges were not administrative faults, so they should not have been handled by a night court. Also, no sentence over 60 days is incommutable."

Arias told ACAN-EFE that LA ESTRELLA VERDE, for which he is legally responsible, has not been banned by the authorities and that it has been publicly distributed during the last 4 months.

On 30 June, the office of the PDC's campaign headquarters were raided and the five people who were inside the office at the time were arrested and sentenced to 1 year in prison.

Party President on Arrests

PA1207235389 Panama City Circuito RPC Television in Spanish 2316 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Statement by Ricardo Arias Calderon, president of the Christian Democratic Party; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] Yesterday, 11 [as heard] more PDC members were arrested. The arrests began at 1000 when Asclepiades Espino and Angel, two party members who are also messengers, were detained. They were arrested in a car as they took mail that was going to be sent through Transportes Ferguson. Packages of the GREEN STAR bulletin they were carrying were also seized.

Last night the two men were charged with distributing subversive material and Night Court Judge Brenmer sentenced them to a year in jail, wih incommutable sentences. Because of the names and addresses on the packages of GREEN STAR bulletins, eight more PDC members have been arrested: David Sanchez from Bocas del Toro Province; Elias Saldana and Wilfredo Justavino from Chiriqui Province; Justo Pastor Duran, Sebastian Escobar, and Luis Peralta from Los Santos Province; Pablo Hernandez from Herrera Province; and Domingo Arcia from Cocle Province.

Most of these persons have been brought to Panama City on the orders of the G-2 and, despite our efforts throughout the day, we have not been able to see them.

UN Envoy Protests U.S. 'Military Provocation'

PA1207233389 Panama City Circuito RPC Television in Spanish 2257 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] Leonardo Kam, Panamanian Ambassador to the United Nations, sent a protest note to the UN Security Council today, reporting that on 8 July, U.S. military forces supported by armored vehicles and helicopters entered Fort Amador, located in Panamanian territory. The note says the U.S. forces occupied several streets and stationed themselves in an offensive position across from the offices of the General Command of the Defense and Security Commission of the Panama Canal.

In its note to the UN Security Council, Ambassador Kam states the events at Fort Amador and the temporary occupation of the town of Gamboa and the Chilibre water plant on 5 July are part of a deliberate U.S. campaign of military provocation and intimidation against Panama.

More on Envoy's Charges

PA1307004889 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2032 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] United Nations, 12 Jul (EFE)—Panama charged today that the United States is violating the UN Charter and "the letter and spirit" of the canal treaties, as well as trying to justify in the eyes of the U.S. public "direct armed intervention" in Panama. In a letter to Yugoslav Dragoslav Pejic, chairman of the UN Security Council, Leonardo Kam, Panamanian representative to the United Nations, reported "incursions" on 8 July at Fort Amador by U.S. troops in armored personnel carriers and helicopters.

The Panamanian representative also reported the "temporary occupation" of areas in Gamboa and other sites by U.S. troops on 5 July.

Kam asserted that these recent actions represent "an acceleration of U.S. plans to intervene militarily in Panama." He also criticized alleged statements by the commander of the U.S. Army South in Panama favoring a military solution to that country's problems mandated by Washington.

These "tell-tale" assertions, combined with U.S. "provocations," indicate that "the United States is trying to fabricate an incident to justify, in the eyes of the U.S. public, direct armed intervention" in Panama, the Panamanian UN representative added.

Kam asked the UN Security Council chairman to "urgently" distribute his letter to all UN member states. He said that, through its "aggressive" actions, the United States is "seriously endangering international peace and security," and will be "solely responsible" for undermining them in the region.

For over a year, the United States has tried unsuccesfully to force General Manuel Antonio Noriega to step down as chief of the Panama Defense Forces. Noriega has been charged with drug trafficking and money laundering in Florida.

Editorial Criticizes U.S. Army South Commander

PA1207140089 Panama City LA REPUBLICA in Spanish 10 Jul 89 p 4

[Editorial: "The Buffoonery of a Clown"]

[Text] That is how we could characterize statements by Southern Command Proconsul [U.S. Army South Commander] Marc Cisneros, who is trying to frighten Panamanians with military parades and "maneuvers" in open violation of the Torrijos-Carter treaties.

This histrionic individual, whose much-touted "heroism" was nowhere to be seen during the Bay of Pigs invasion and who repeated his "retreat" in Vietnam, has been sent in his capacity as a "hybrid" [referring to his Mexican ancestry] to frighten Panamanians with statements that a masked buffoon would make, as if we—Panamanian patriots—are children who are easily scared by a devil's mask.

He talks about having the support of Latin American generals, who are blood brothers of our people's sons and share the pain of a dead brother, but if it were not for the presence of U.S. armies and the orders of governments that bribe with dollars, no independent general would agree to a massacre of the Panamanian people.

The Southern Command clown knows, but chooses to ignore, that the American continent's peoples, through their most outstanding organizations, are repudiating the actions of U.S. rulers and the merciless aggression that the sons of our country are heroically enduring.

We are convinced that some of our best youths might fall in the massacre that the Southern Command proconsul is planning with the Pentagon's acquiescence. But it is also true that many coffins wrapped with the stars and stripes and containing the bodies of numerous U.S. youths sacrificed by Cisneros will enter the ports of Miami and New York to be buried at Arlington Cemetery.

The U.S. national of Mexican ancestry, who is ashamed of his origin, should think about his countrymen who could also be massacred. Those who, supported by Washington, are encouraging him to sow terror in Panama and promote a war, which only exists in the warmongering and sick minds of U.S. generals and President Bush, should also reflect on that.

FMLN Group Meets With Panamanian Peace Group

PA1307010089 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0007 GMT 13 Jul 89

[Text] Panama City, 12 Jul, (ACAN-EFE)—A Salvadoran guerrilla delegation is meeting today in Panama with representatives of the "Permanent Committee for National Debate for Peace" [Comite Permanente del Debate Nacional Para la Paz], which is comprised of many Panamanian organizations.

According to information supplied to ACAN-EFE by sources who did not want to be identified, several top Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] leaders are attending the meeting.

The sources said that when the meeting ends tomorrow, the press will be told of the goals and objectives of the dialogue, which seeks an agreement to end the Salvadoran war.

FMLN Commanders Joaquin Villalobos and Leonel Gonzalez held a meeting in Panama in late 1988 with San Salvador Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas, who is one of the promoters of this "committee."

On that occasion, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, head of the Panama Defense Forces received the guerrilla leaders and the prelate.

OAS Delegation Announces 14 Jul Return Date

PA1307123589 Panama City Circuito RPC Television in Spanish 2353 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] The OAS delegation composed of the Ecuadoran, Guatemalan, and Trinidadian and Tobagan foreign ministers and OAS Secretary General Joao Baena Soares announced a few minutes ago in Washington that it will return for the third time to Panama on 14 July. The delegation will attempt to promote a national agreement among Panamanians. The OAS has received messages from the parties in conflict stating the necessity for the return of the OAS delegation to Panama City for a third time.

FDP Announces Retirement of 5 Officers

PA1207231189 Panama City Circuito RPC Television in Spanish 2253 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] According to a report received a few minutes ago from the Panama Defense Forces [FDP] Information and Public Relations Directorate, we have learned that during a meeting held this morning at the FDP headquarters, the High Command and the General Staff agreed to retire the following officers: Colonel Elias Castillo Figueroa, Colonel Jose Santos Motta, Lieutenant Colonel Ricardo Garibaldo, Lieutenant Colonel Aristides Ivan Hassan, and Lieutenant Colonel Dr Carlos Garcia Aguilera. The communique issued by the FDP Information and Public Relations Directorate states that this action was taken within the framework of present institutional dynamics and reorganization.

Argentina

Menem Attempts To End Hostilities With UK

PY1207150089 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1426 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] Buenos Aires, 12 Jul (TELAM)—President Carlos Menem today stated that Argentina "would be willing to declare the cessation of hostilities" that Great Britain has repeatedly requested since the armed conflict over the Malvinas Islands, if that country "promises to lift the zone of exclusion."

"We are going to talk with Great Britain and keep the issue of sovereignty under an 'umbrella,' under a 'sunshade.' This is an issue that we are never going to give up, and neither, I believe, will Great Britain. But meanwhile, we are going to hold a civilized dialogue," he stated.

Asked whether the English request for a formal cessation of hostilities by Argentina could receive a positive answer, Menem stated: "Well yes, in order to hold a dialogue. But Great Britain must also make the necessary and fundamental gestures, such as allowing Argentine entry into the zone of exclusion."

Menem made these remarks this morning on leaving his home on Posadas Street to go to the Central Post Office, where he installed Maria Julia Alsogaray as trustee of ENTEL [National Telecommunications Enterprise]

Menem Ratifies Proposal

PY1207173889 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1708 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] Buenos Aires, 12 Jul (TELAM)—President Carlos Menem has ratified that the Argentine Government is willing to declare a cessation of hostilities with Great Britain as long as Margaret Thatcher's administration decides to suspend the exclusion zone that surrounds the Malvinas Islands.

This was stated this afternoon by Presidential Spokesman Humberto Toledo in the press room of Government House.

UK Reaction 'Positive'

PY1207030489 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 0042 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] Buenos Aires, 11 Jul (DYN)—President Carlos Menem today evaluated with Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo the reactions elicited abroad, especially from Great Britain, by his remarks on "a possible negotiation with that country and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations."

In remarks to newsmen at Government House after meeting with the president, Cavallo said: "In accordance with our evaluation, they (Menem's remarks) elicited a favorable, positive reaction."

Cavallo said: "We believe that, except for some words that were mistranslated intentionally or unintentionally, the president's remarks elicited a positive reaction."

Cavallo said: "The president never spoke about leaving aside the sovereignty issue during the talks." Cavallo said the president "spoke of protecting our rights by placing the sovereignty issue under an umbrella or a glass cover so that it may be discussed at the right time as progress is made in resolving all the other issues, including the reestablishment of relations, if the conditions are appropriate."

Regarding this possibility, Cavallo said: "We stated our disposition and our reassurances that, as the president said in his inaugural address, we will seek to recover our Malvinas through legal means."

Cavallo also reported that today President Menem sent a message to French President Francois Mitterrand congratulating him on the occasion of the bicentennial of the French Revolution, but declining the invitation to attend this celebration.

Cavallo added: "We intend to arrange a meeting between President Menem and his U.S. counterpart, George Bush, "but because the schedules of both presidents are very delicate, complex matters, one cannot talk about dates at this time."

Military, Menem Attempt To Solve Military Issue

Seineldin Asks To Retire

PY1207032889 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2325 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Excerpt] Buenos Aires ,11 Jul (NA)—It has been reported in this capital that Colonel Mohamed Seineldin has formally asked to retire and that the Army chief of staff is considering Seineldin's request.

The report, which was released tonight by Radio Continental, cites highly reliable sources from the Libertador Building [Army headquarters].

Sources close to Seineldin, who has been under arrest at the Palermo Support Unit, told NA that it is "technically" impossible for Seineldin to ask to retire because he is currently facing an Army inquest.

Seineldin is facing an inquest for leading the Villa Martelli military rebellion last December; Seineldin's followers consider him "chief of the new national Army."

Speaking separately, some military sources said that "Col Seineldin may have asked to retire to contribute to solving the military situation." [passage omitted]

Menem on Solution to Problem

PY1207223689 Buenos Aires Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] Upon leaving his residence this morning, President Carlos Menem said that Colonel Seineldin's decision to ask to be retired paves the way for a solution to the military problem.

The president said that Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico will do the same. Menem added that military problems will be solved little by little and that soon we will have a completely united Army at the service of the country.

Regarding Seineldin and Rico's future, Menem said the country needs every citizen. He added that the two officers could be useful to the country, albeit their specific capacity.

Menem reiterated he will implement a military policy different to that implemented by Alfonsin's government, and added that no one can govern against the Armed Forces, or govern with the Armed Forces against the government.

Defense Minister on Trials

PY1207201389 Buenos Aires Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Report from Government House by Silvina Martinez Porta]

[Text] Following the ceremony today in which Admiral Emilio Osses was installed as Armed Forces joint chief of staff we talked with Defense Minister Italo Argentino Luder.

Luder said that the government will not interfere in the trials of the military officers who violated human rights, by declaring either an amnesty or pardon for them. Luder added that the Army conflict will be analyzed case by case.

Regarding a possible pardon and the situation of Colonel Seineldin and Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico, the defense minister said the following:

[Begin recording] [Luder] Amnesty was granted by the Radical Civic Union administration through the full stop law and the due obedience law. These laws override all juridical procedures relating to the events that took place during the antisubversive war and remove the responsibility from more than 1,000 defendants. There only remain the cases of 18 generals who are still standing trial. The court is handling the cases, so we will not interfere. According to the Constitution, Congress and the executive branch can resort to alternative mechanisms, and this will be analyzed when the time comes.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] ...did Seineldin and Rico request their retirement?

[Luder] I have said that the Army conflict will be analyzed case by case. Not all who participated in the Army conflict are in the same situation. Therefore I do not think this is the appropriate time to comment on any case since the Army chief of staff will be installed this afternoon during a ceremony over which I will preside. Following his installation we will analyze the situation case by case, including that of Colonel Seineldin. [end recording]

As for the economic situation, Minister Luder said that we must all make an effort and that there is no place for sectorial disputes. The Armed Forces should understand this, he said, adding that the Defense Ministry will work hard to reestablish unity among the Armed Forces, especially in the Army.

Joint Chief of Staff Vice Adm Osses said that the Armed Forces will not be efficient or quick to react if they do not face problems together. There is no doubt of the future unity among the three forces, Osses said.

New Army Chief 'Hopeful'

PY1207235889 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1956 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] Buenos Aires, 12 Jul (TELAM)—General Isidro Caceres, Army chief of general staff, said this afternoon that the institution is "hopeful" about finding "solutions to the saga of the war against subversion and to the South Atlantic." He added: "We believe our people will understand because we have fought a legitimate war in defense of our national interests."

Caceres, who this afternoon assumed the command of the Army replacing General Francisco Gassino, admitted that "we could have made mistakes, just like the rest of society." He added: "The fatherland's state of semi-prostration is proof of the mistakes made by all Argentines."

During his speech after the installation ceremony at the Patricios 1st Regiment in the Palermo neighborhood, Caceres said: "I was called to cooperate during this delicate and critical moment for the fatherland. I could not refuse the call because I must contribute to the creation of a professional Army that is respectful of society and loved by its people."

Caceres said: "The special situation affecting some of our comrades will be reviewed with the spirit of union and reconciliation mentioned by the president in his message to the nation, with justice and reason, the basis of discipline."

"We will try to heal the internal wounds of the Army so it can become part of society and contribute to our national pacification and reunion," Caceres concluded.

Menem Meets Ethiopian Acting Foreign Minister
PY1307032089 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 0012 GMT 13 Jul 89

[Text] Buenos Aires, 12 Jul (TELAM)—This morning at Government House President Carlos Menem met with Ethiopian Acting Foreign Minister Feleke Gefgle Giorgis, who headed an Ethiopian delegation to the presidential inauguration.

In a brief statement to the press, Giorgis said after the meeting that the Ethiopian Government is interested in strengthening bilateral relations.

He added: "Argentina plays an important role in Latin American and world affairs, and African countries are interested in establishing all manner of bilateral exchanges in the area of science and technology."

Menem Calls for Businessmen's Cooperation
PY1207195589 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1327 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Excerpt] Buenos Aires, 12 Jul (TELAM)—President Carlos Menem today asked "those who increase prices to be prudent," and warned them that "our prudence has limits," adding that "we shall not allow these people to continue fooling with the hunger of the people."

Menem made this statement after installing Maria Julia Alsogaray as trustee at the National Telecommunications Enterprise (ENTEL). [passage omitted]

Czechoslovak Official Meets Vice President
LD1107120889 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 0600 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Text]In Buenos Aires Vice President Eduardo Duhalde received Bohumil Urban, first deputy premier of the federal government, who led a Czechoslovak delegation at the inauguration of the new Argentine president. The two representatives expressed interest in further intensifying and developing mutual cooperation, above all in favor of extending economic cooperation.

Government Favors OAS Solution to Panama Issue
PY1307033689 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 0128 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] Buenos Aires, 12 Jul (DYN)—Today the Argentine Government stated that the political conflict affecting Panama should be resolved within the framework of the OAS upholding the principles of self-determination and nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other countries.

Raul Carignano, Foreign Ministry secretary for Latin American affairs, briefed the Panamanian ambassador to Argentina on the Argentine Government's position during a meeting held this afternoon. The meeting was held in view of the upcoming OAS foreign ministers consultation meeting to be held in Washington next week to discuss the Panamanian issue.

This OAS meeting will study a report to be submitted by an OAS commission comprising three foreign ministers and OAS Secretary General Joao Baena Soares. This commission recently visited Panama to study that country's political situation.

Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo and Secretary Carignano are scheduled to attend the OAS meeting which begins 19 July.

Army Announces Retirement of V Corps Commander
PY1207040089 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1950 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Text] Bahia Blanca, 11 Jul (NA)—It has been officially reported that the Office of the Army Chief of Staff has accepted the request for retirement submitted by Brigadier General Osvaldo Cordoba, commander of the V Corps.

Cordoba submitted his request on 4 July to Army Chief of Staff General Francisco Gassino, who accepted it on the same date.

Sources consulted at Villa Floresta, the seat of the V Corps headquarters, said that Cordoba is attending a meeting of commanding officers in Buenos Aires.

Cordoba was installed as V Corps commander in December 1988 replacing General Humberto Pompilio Ferrucci. The V Corps has jurisdiction over the Patagonia region.

After being promoted to general in 1986, Cordoba was director of the army higher training school.

Cordoba, 55, was born in Buenos Aires and served in several cavalry units. He is considered one of the generals who strongly advocate the constitutional order.

The brief communique released by the V Corps General Secretariat does not mention the name of Cordoba's successor.

Navy Rescue To Hold Joint Exercises With Chile

PY1207183889 Buenos Aires Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] Chilean Rear Admiral Eduardo Oelckers has reported that the Argentine and Chilean Navies will carry out search and rescue exercises in the sea, by the end of August, south of the Beagle Channel. Oelckers made this statement in Punta Arenas, 2,180 km south of Santiago.

Oelckers, commander of the Chilean 3rd Naval Zone, led a group of high-ranking Chilean Navy officers who participated in a meeting with Argentine Navy members led by Rear Admiral Juan Carlos Bou, chief of the Argentine Southern Naval zone.

Biographical Data on New Air Force, Naval Chiefs

PY1107215989 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1034 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Excerpt] Buenos Aires, 11 Jul (TELAM)—[Passage omitted]

Major General Jose Antonio Julia, who is the new Air Force chief of staff, was born on 14 July 1934. He is married to Ana Maria Noceti Garat and has four children.

He joined the Military Aviation School in 1953 and graduated as ensign on 7 December 1956. After graduation he was assigned to the 2d Fighter Group of the 7th Air Brigade in Moron as squadron leader of the Gloster Meteor IV airplanes.

He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1975 and then assigned to the 5th Air Brigade. He was then transferred to the Air Force General Staff. He was Air attache to the Argentine Embassy in Bolivia and also chief of the advisory mission for the operation and maintenance of Sabre F-86 F airplanes.

He was appointed Air Force secretary general in 1984 and promoted to brigadier general in December 1986. He was appointed commander of air operations in 1987 and promoted to major general on 31 December 1988.

Rear Admiral Jose Ferrer, who is the new chief of the Navy, was born on 26 January 1933 in the federal capital. He joined the Navy as a cadet on 1 February 1950.

He was also trained in submarines, antisubmarines warfare and in submarine fleet type operations in 1958. In 1962 he took courses on submarine weapons. In 1967 he took courses on counter-mine operations in the United States and in 1974 he took the command and general staff course of the Naval War School.

After he became rear admiral he held the positions of Naval operations command, Naval attache of the Argentine Embassy in the United States and Naval secretary general.

Vice Admiral Emilio Osses, who was appointed chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was born on 7 December 1933 in Isla Verde, Cordoba Province. He joined the Navy as a cadet on 2 February 1949.

The courses he took during his Naval career include oceanography in 1957, antisubmarine warfare in 1960, air control operations in 1965, maritime traffic control and instructin in 1970, and command and general staff in the Naval War School in 1972.

He was decorated by Ecuador with the Armed Forces Star Award in 1976, by Venezuela with the Second Merit Award in 1977 and by Brazil with the Naval Merit Award in 1985. As vice admiral he was the commander of the Sea Fleet.

Brazil

Sarney Departs for French Bicentennial

PY1207004989 Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo Television in Portuguese 2300 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Text] President Sarney departed for France this afternoon. The president will participate in the bicentennial celebration of the French Revolution.

Sarney delegated the Presidency to Chamber of Deputies President Pais de Andrade during a ceremony at the Brasilia Air Force Base before departing. Sarney is scheduled back in Brazil on 15 July.

3-Day Visit Planned

PY1207143489 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 1000 GMT 12 Jul 89

[By Lourival Macedo]

[Excerpts] (?Thirty) chiefs of state have already confirmed their visit to Paris to attend the French Revolution bicentennial ceremonies. [passage omitted]

It is 1229 in France now. President Jose Sarney arrived in Paris this morning to attend the bicentennial ceremonies. Sarney arrived at the Orly Airport at 0945 (0445 Brasilia time). Sarney was received by Marne Valley Governor (Henri Rouanet) and by Industry Minister Roger Fauroux. President Sarney, Mrs Sarney, and their entourage are now at the Saint James official residence, which was placed at their disposal by the French Government. President Sarney's entourage is comprised of Foreign Minister Abreu Sodre; Communications Minister Antonio Carlos Magalhaes; Military Household Chief General Bayma Denis; Senator Jarbas Passarinho, Social Democratic Party—Para; Senator Marcondes Gadelha, Liberal Front Party leader in the Senate; businessmen Adolfo Bloch, Cid Varela, and Jose Cusalli, Jr, and O GLOBO reporter Lucia Toribio. [passage omitted]

President Sarney will return to Brasilia on the morning of 15 July.

Brazil's Nuclear Program Undergoes Change

Fast Breeder Program Proposed

PY1207035689 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 10 Jul 89 p 8-A

[By Tania Malheiros]

[Text] Rex Nazareth, 52, president of the National Commission for Nuclear Energy (CNEN), has said that Brazil and Argentina are jointly developing the technology to build the first reactor capable of regenerating fast neutrons ("fast breeder") in Latin America.

The main advantage of this reactor is its ability to produce its own fuel. It is called a fast breeder reactor. It consumes uranium and plutonium, and produces plutonioum. According to Nazareth, the Nuclear Engineering Institute (IEN) of the CNEN headquartered in Ilha do Fundao (northern zone of Rio), is testing "fast breeder" components and systems. Argentina is responsible for supplying the fuel.

Rex Nazareth said the project was born 2 years ago after the two countries realized that "each was doing things that could be put together to make the program feasible." Nazareth explained that experts from the two countries met to define the details and the resources needed for the project. According to Rex Nazareth, the "fast breeder" reactor will be capable of attending to the needs of the entire world.

Nazareth said that Brazil and Argentina had to slow the development of the "fast breeder" program because of the economic problems the two countries face. Despite the difficulties, however, the two countries are trying to implement other complementary programs to maintain and develop what is considered a priority program. The program to develop the fast breeder reactor could take up to 25 years. Nazareth said that other Latin American countries could participate in similar programs if their technological development permits.

According to Nazareth, the international market price of $40 (140 cruzados at the parallel exchange rate) per kilo of uranium makes the development of the reactor too expensive for some countries. Nazareth said that the fact that Brazil has the fifth largest uranium reserves in the world places the country in a very favorable situation for the development of the program with Argentina.

According to Nazareth, Brazil and Argentina are currently cooperating in the nuclear area in matters of security, materiel, nuclear fuels, and instrument development. The two countries participate "as a block" in the "International Working Group of Fast Reactors," which include the "fast breeder." The working group is a branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquartered in Vienna, Austria. "We participate as observers," Nazareth said.

Nuclear Program Threatened

PY1207190089 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 11 Jul 89 p 14

[Text] Sao Paulo—A shortage of funds is threatening the implementation of the Brazilian nuclear program and can interfere with three of the program's main projects: the production of nuclear fuel for research reactors, the development of a model reactor to be used in submarines, and the production of radio isotopes for medicinal use.

Rear Admiral Othon Pinheiro da Silva, coordinator of the Navy's Special Projects, and Claudio Rodrigues, superintendent of the Institute for Nuclear and Energy Research, IPEN, admit that the program will be delayed. The situation is thus very serious, because the nuclear fuel stock will last 1 year, at most.

Because Brazil has been a victim of an international boycott and has not been able to import nuclear fuel since 1978 because it has not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the only solution for the country is to produce its own fuel. Brazil needs the fuel for the research reactors and will use it for a submarine reactor in the future.

Two stages of nuclear fuel production—the initial one, in which the uranium paste is transformed into gas; and the last one, in which the fuel is actually produced—are undertaken at IPEN. The other stages are conducted at the Aramar Center. Any delay in the program's schedule will prevent Aramar from meeting its goal of producing 12 kg of uranium enriched to 20 percent by January.

Othon Pinheiro da Silva said the construction of the Reactors Development Center—which will house the first prototype of the submarine reactor—will also be affected if the 50-million-new-cruzado fund approved for this year is not up-dated and readjusted. The shortage of funds at IPEN affects not only fuel production but also radioisotope production. IPEN's superintendent, Claudio Rodrigues, said he will have to postpone the projects to speed up the operation rhythm of the research reactor and to increase its capacity to 5 megawatts. These projects, the implementation of which was scheduled for September, are fundamental to making Brazil self-sufficient in the production of radioisotopes.

Health Ministry Buys Meningitis Vaccines

PY1207172789 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 11 Jul 89 p 6

[Text] Brasilia—Brazil will exchange products, including frozen chickens, soy beans, cars, buses and trucks, for Cuban vaccines against B type meningitis [meningite B]. The first shipment out of a total of five will arrive in August. The rest of the shipment of 2 million doses of vaccines will be delivered to Brazil before the end of year. The Health Ministry intends to stock 10 million doses which will be used to attend only high risk areas, thus ruling out the possibility of massive vaccination campaigns.

This was reported yesterday by Health Minister Seigo Tsuzuki, who on 10 July returned from a 6-day visit to Cuba. Tsuzuki said that Cuban President Fidel Castro had been objective and said that it was not necessary "to sign papers for the delivery of vaccines." The price of each dose, which is about $10, is being negotiated with Cuba. The Interbras [Petrobras International Trade, Inc.] representative, a member of the Brazilian mission, remained in Havana to negotiate this price.

The Cuban vaccines will arrive in Brazil in bulk, and will be diluted and bottled in the Osvaldo Cruz Foundation [Fiocruz] laboratories. This procedure initiates a transference of technology in that immunity agents against B type meningitis will be produced. Fiocruz President Akira Homma, and two experts remained in Cuba to settle the details for the transfer of this technology and other research projects.

Tsuzuki said that Brazil is particularly interested in the SUMA [expansion unknown] blood testing kit, which detects the AIDS virus, among others. The purpose is to develop similar kits with which to diagnose malaria and Chagas disease, which are widespread in the country. This task will be undertaken jointly by Brazilian and Cuban experts, according to the letter of intent signed during the visit of the Brazilian mission.

Cuban Public Health Minister Julio Teja will come to Brazil next September. Tsuzuki said that Brazil is very interested in the production of serum and vaccines and in biotechnology research, areas in which Cuba is more developed.

The current trade exchange between Brazil and Cuba will increase by five times. Currently trade exchange amounts to an annual $20 million. The negotiation opened by the Health Ministry will allow Cubans to buy about 10,000 cars, or 5,000 trucks, or the equivalent of 50,000 bags of 50 kg each of soy beans.

Chile

Candidate Aylwin Resigns as PDC President

PY1307022889 Santiago Radio Cooperativa Network in Spanish 2300 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Report by Jose Miguel Alfaro]

[Text] Patricio Aylwin, presidential candidate for the Coalition of Parties for Democracy [CPPD], has tendered his resignation as president of the Christian Democratic Party [PDC].

A letter Aylwin sent to PDC First Vice President Andres Zaldivar was released today at the PDC headquarters during a meeting of the PDC national executive board.

In his letter, Aylwin said that because of his nomination as CPPD presidential candidate he deems it necessary to step down as PDC president to devote his time to his electoral campaign, which should have a multiparty nature.

Aylwin then asked Zaldivar to take prompt action on his resignation and to immediately take over as acting PDC president until the PDC national executive board makes a decision on the subject.

Finally, Aylwin thanked all PDC members and the members of the PDC national executive board for their cooperation during his presidency.

PCCh Officially Endorses Aylwin

PY1307040089 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 2300 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] The Chilean Communist Party [PCCh] has officially endorsed the presidential candidacy of Patricio Aylwin. The PCCh emphasized, however, that it has not signed any pact or treaty with the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in this regard.

Jorge Insunza, the main spokesman of this outlawed Marxist organization, also said that the PCCh has not offered to participate in a possible future government led by the PDC.

[Begin Insunza recording] We communists have not been called, and we have not offered, to participate in a future democratic government which will surely be headed by Patricio Aylwin. However, we will support anything this government can do to benefit the people, and we will contribute to defend it against reactionary threats.

We frankly state that from now on we will make every effort to implement, under the democratic system, the basic platform prepared and approved during the 15th PCCh national congress. [end recording]

In this basic platform, the communists propose the destruction of the existing institutions by ousting top military leaders and the release of all terrorists, among other things.

Other communist leaders reported that the PCCh will nominate 3 candidates for senator and 14 for deputy. The senators will run in the second, fourth and fifth regions; while three deputies will run for the Santiago districts of Cerro Navia, Macul, Nunoa, and Providencia. [sentence as heard]

Concerning possible PCCh participation in the presidential campaign, some communist leaders said that they will support it and that they might even be allowed to make speeches at the rallies.

Communists View Events in PRC, USSR, Cuba

PY1207221389 Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 2 Jul 89 p C-2

[Text] The Communist Party of Chile [PCCh] said yesterday in a news conference that the events that have occurred in the PRC, the USSR, Poland, and Cuba indicate "forms, methods, and even models, for building socialism which is now going through a crisis." Therefore, the PCCh reaffirms "its all-out support for the intensive search that is currently taking place for a more profound reorganization."

In this regard the PCCh said that it maintains its "conviction that the multi-party system should prevail in the construction of a new socialist society in our country." The PCCh also said that "a planned central economy should be reconciled with the operation of the market" thus rejecting "the identification of state property as the only way to own property."

The party also advocates "freedom of artistic and scientific expression" and rejects the idea of official support for any particular school.

The communist leaders also explained that the PCCh believes that "socialism must discover in every country the most effective mechanisms to guarantee the audit and control of the different aspects of the political regime which in a state of law would prevent the discretional and irrestricted use of power."

The news conference was given by Jorge Inzunza, member or the PCCh Political Committee; Orel Viciani, political scientist and former communist deputy; and David Escanilla, member of the Communist Youth Central Committee.

The communist leaders indicated that the electoral results in Poland clearly show "what happens when the leadership of the Communist Party and the government get away from the feelings of the majority of the population." They indicate, however, that the latest elections

in Poland "show the democratic potential which has emerged from socialism." The leaders called on the Polish regime "to persevere in that direction."

The PCCh also condemned "the serious events in the PRC" because "the decision made only postpones or prolongs the crisis and does not strengthen socialism.

The communist leaders also expressed concern over "the worsening of the ethnic problems in the Soviet Union." They indicated, however, their conviction that "the solid basis for a more equal development of the people of the USSR, in addition to the new enviroment of greater political democracy advocated by perestroika," will solve those problems.

In the face of "the very serious cases of corruption affecting high ranking leaders" of the Cuban regime, the Chilean communist leaders expressed solidarity with the decisions made to clarify the cases of corruption and their conviction that "the Cuban revolution will be enhanced by this difficult situation."

Socialists Reject Modifications to Constitution

PY1207161289 Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 2 Jul 89 p C-2

[Text] Juan Carlos Moraga, head of the Socialist Party (PS), yesterday explained that his party is urging its members to vote "no" in the plebiscite because the PS believes the modifications to the Constitution proposed by the government are only cosmetic and not real modifications.

Commenting on Article 8, Moraga said the only modification proposed is a change in the article's number. He added that this article has already been improved and that exile no longer exists in Chile since the 5 October plebiscite. Currently, all exiled political leaders, including Volodia Teitelboim, secretary general of the Chilean Communist party, can return to the country.

Moraga said that "more than 40" of the proposed modifications "are simply grammatical corrections" to the current text. "They are not really modifications," he said.

"This is happening because what was expected was a modification in the number of seats each political sector would have in Congress. The most concrete example of the difficulties the opposition coalition is having regarding the number of seats is the situation created in Santiago, where Frei, Lagos, and Zaldivar are runing for congressional seats."

Moraga said that in view of this situation, the PS decided to warn the people in various ways about the real meaning of the modifications proposed by the government. He added that the PS believes the best solution to the problem is to have the congressmen who will be elected in December modify the constitutional text.

Moraga said that next week the PS will urge all of its members to reject the modifications by casting blank votes, annulling their votes, or abstaining from voting. "If the opposition coalition, which is united with the government in this plebiscite, obtains less than 97 percent of the vote, they will have been defeated. In this case, those who won with the no-vote in the last plebiscite will have been defeated with the yes-vote in the 30 July plebiscite," Moraga said.

Moraga said the Chilean PS will present an alternative presidential candidate if more than 12 percent of the voters reject the modifications.

Revolutionary Movement Takes Credit for Murder

PY1207180189 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 1030 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Text] A package containing a Carabinero cap and a letter signed by the Revolutionary Movement People in Arms [Movimiento Revolucionario Pueblo en Armas] was left at the Valparaiso Radio Portales studio on 1190 Condel Street. In the letter the movement claims responsibility for the murder of Carabinero officer Patricio Canihuante in Vina del Mar.

Following the discovery of the package by members of the Carabineros Special Actions Squad [Patrulla de Acciones Especiales—PAES] an intensive dragnet operation was launched in the area around the studio. The operation led to the arrest of three individuals riding sports motorbikes while waving a banner of the Communist Party on Atkinson Boulevard, on Concepcion Hill, a few meters from the radio station where the package containing the alleged cap of the murdered carabinero was left.

Over 50 Armed Individuals Abduct 11 People

PY1207192089 Santiago Radio Chile Network in Spanish 1700 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Excerpts] Eleven people were abducted from their homes in Jose Maria Caro neighborhood by a large group of armed individuals, some of whom were hooded. These individuals barged into houses, hastily searched them, and then took away some of the occupants.

Over 50 heavily armed individuals, some 15 of them hooded and wearing green track suits with the Carabinero emblem, raided several houses in the neighborhood. [passage omitted]

The relatives of the abducted people went to the 11th Police Station to inquire about their whereabouts but were informed that this station had not ordered the operation. The detained people have not been taken to other police stations, either, so their relatives fear for their fate.

Ecuador

Five Political Parties Support General Strike

PA1007194389 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0514 GMT 9 Jul 89

[Text] Quito, 9 Jul (EFE)—Through an agreement signed by their deputies at the National Congress, five Ecuadoran political parties decided to support the call for an indefinite general strike made by the Sole Workers Front (FUT).

The resolution was signed by representatives of the Ecuadoran Socialist Party (PSE), the Democratic People's Movement (MPE), the Ecuadoran Roldosist Party (PRE), the Concentration of Popular Forces, (CFP), and the Alfarist Radical Party (FRA).

The document maintains that "the legislators are fulfilling their duty to support this struggle because the government has shown no political desire to meet the people's demands."

Because of this resolution, the government has called off the agreements signed with the FUT following a week of intense negotiations, Labor Minister Cesar Verduga announced today.

In statements issued by the National Public Information Secretariat, Verguda charged labor unions with "permitting the political manipulation of their struggle." The strike is scheduled for 12 July.

Verduga said political parties such as the FRA, CFP, and the PRE, all populist parties, have never been linked to the labor union movement, "but now they are manipulating the labor movement to exert political influence."

PSE Deputy Victor Granda and MPE Deputy Juan Cardenas said the agreement to support the strike is an effort to unite political forces, not to form a bloc against the government.

The labor unions composing the FUT decided on 1 July—during a meeting in which they rejected the government's response to the workers' demands—to call for a general strike. The FUT's demands include the suspension of a proposed law on job sharing, the approval of salary increases, and a price freeze on staple goods.

Uruguay

Reportage on Sanguinetti Visit to Portugal

Meets President Soares

PY1107132489 Montevideo Radio Carve in Spanish 0000 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Text] This afternoon President Sanguinetti began a 2 and 1/2-day official visit to Portugal. His first official act was to lay a wreath of flowers on the tomb of Luis de Camoes, a 16th-century Portuguese poet, at the Jeronimos Monastery, in Lisbon.

Sanguinetti visited the monastery, which was built in memory of Portuguese navigators, in the company of Portuguese President Mario Soares, Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva, and the mayor of Lisbon.

Sanguinetti later held a long meeting with President Soares at the Belem Presidential Palace, located a few hundred meters from the Jeronimos Monastery.

According to Portuguese sources, during the meeting the two presidents analyzed the political and economic relations between their two countries and discussed international problems, particularly the Latin American situation.

The two presidents exchanged presents: Soares presented Sanguinetti with a work of Portuguese sculptor Victor Ribeiro and a painting of Julio Spomar, one of the most prominent modern Portuguese painters. Sanguinetti presented Soares with a historic document and a printing done on occasion of the foundation of the United Kingdom of Portugal and Brazil.

Soares' wife presented Mrs Sanguinetti with a complete collection of La Portugaria Monumenta, Cartografia. Mrs Sanguinetti presented Mrs Soares with a piece of jewelry.

Tonight Soares gave a reception for Sanguinetti at the Ajuda Palace. Tomorrow Sanguinetti will receive Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and the diplomatic corps in Portugal at the Queluz Palace, the official residence of foreign dignitaries. In the afternoon, Sanguinetti will meet with Portuguese businessmen at the Republican Assembly. At night Sanguinetti will offer a reception at the Queluz Palace.

Meets Prime Minister Cavaco Silva

LD1107215389 Lisbon International Service in Portuguese 1830 GMT 11 Jul 89

[Text] In Lisbon today Prime Minister Cavaco Silva had a meeting with the visiting Uruguayan President Julio Sanguinetti. Matters concerning ways to strengthen Uruguayan-Portuguese relations and to broaden the relationship with the European Community countries were some of the subjects which dominated the meeting.

Concerning Portuguese-Uruguayan relations Cavaco Silva said Portugal is an industrialized country that needs to import raw material from Uruguay but pointed out that Portugal is a market for Uruguay more than Uruguay is for Portugal.

After his audience with Cavaco Silva, the visiting head of state received a courtesy call from members of the diplomatic corps accredited to Portugal.

A luncheon hosted by the Portuguese prime minister was also part of the Uruguayan head of state's program today. Speaking at the luncheon, Julio Sanguinetti said that the (?abolition) of national boundaries within the European Economic Community is a step toward world cooperation. [passage indistinct]

Holds Press Conference

LD1307041689 Lisbon Radio Renascenca in Portuguese to Europe 1800 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Excerpts] The president of Uruguay ended a 3-day official visit to Portugal today. Before leaving Lisbon Julio Sanguinetti held a press conference at Queluz Palace. Our reporter, Enid Saldanha, was there.

[Saldanha] Closer bilateral relations were the prime objective of Sanguinetti's visit. Uruguay is keen to step up economic relations, and Portugal now is presenting itself with potentials and horizons molded along EEC lines. [passage omitted]

[Begin Sanguinetti recording in Spanish] No, no, no, we did not make any agreement. What we did establish basically is to stimulate visits by businesses. We think that both Uruguay and Portugal have important mutual trade potentials. [end recording] [Saldonha] The Uruguayan head of state said the two Iberian countries were the priviliged spokesmen for his country at the EEC, given their historical and cultural affinities.

Latin America was the inevitable topic of the talks during this visit. Julio Sanguinetti pointed out that Uruguay today is going through a phase of economic and political stability and that the problems facing Latin America are related to the ongoing democratization process.

Uruguay is to hold presidential elections in November, but Sanguinetti is not in the race.